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ABSTRACT 
Product quality and product differentiation have become increasingly important to 
producers and policymakers for explaining consumer choice over food products. 
Consumers are often willing to pay large price premiums for products with preferred 
attributes. Heterogeneity in quality increases the diversity of goods for consumers and 
can improve welfare. However, variation in quality also leads to higher transaction costs 
for consumers, producers and policymakers because quality attributes are hard to identify 
precisely and vary when the state of the world changes. The first essay addresses the 
issue of food-quality attributes driven by protectionist policy that inhibits exchange 
between two countries. Technical barriers to trade based on phyto-sanitary standards and 
their impact on food trade are investigated by accounting for quality heterogeneity based 
on the origin of the good (imported versus domestic) and for consumers’ home-good 
preference. The second essay is concerned with the complex interaction between quality 
promotion, through brand advertising and geographical indication, and quality improving 
effort in the context of asymmetric information. The results show that if a producer 
makes the effort to improve quality level, the producer will prefer to rely on brand 
advertising for promoting its products and setting up its own reputation. Despite allowing 
the cost of promotion to be shared, a geographical indication does not sufficiently reward 
the effort to improve quality. The third essay addresses the effect of interaction between 
organic attributes, an intrinsic attribute of food and appearance, an extrinsic attribute of 
food. Evidence from an experimental auction shows that a majority of consumers are 
willing to pay more for organic than for conventional apples. However, at the first sight 
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of any deterioration in the appearance of the organic apples, this segment is significantly 
reduced. Furthermore, cosmetic damage has a larger impact on the average willingness to 
pay for organic apples than for conventional apples. 
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CHAPTER 1.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
Introduction            
When products vary in quality, consumers may not observe quality differences or be fully 
informed about the attributes of products in the market. Consumers are often willing to 
pay large price premiums for products with the right attributes. As a result, product 
quality and product differentiation have become increasingly important to producers and 
policymakers as they rely on good information on consumer choices in food markets to 
enhance profit and structure effective regulation and public policy.  
Economic theory considers such problems by classifying goods by three types of 
product quality characteristics: search, experience and credence characteristics (Darby 
and Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970, 1974). Search characteristics can be ascertained before 
the purchase, for example, the size and color of apples. In contrast, experience 
characteristics are characteristics that can only be established by experiencing the 
product, for example, the taste of wine. Credence characteristics cannot be validated (or 
can be validated only at very high cost) by consumers either before or after the purchase, 
for example, whether a bag of apples is produced organically or not. The distinction 
among characteristics is useful because appropriate public policy response is needed to 
reduce market failure that occurs when the costs of information are high. Often the 
characteristics are considered using the dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic product 
attributes (Olson and Jacoby, 1972) and incorporated into multi-attribute models of 
choice (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Cohen, Fishbein and Ahtola, 1972; Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 1975; Lutz and Bettman, 1977), Intrinsic attributes are attributes of the physical 
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product, for example, type of grapes used in producing wine, or size, brix (a measure of 
sugar level) and cosmetic appearance of apples. Extrinsic attributes are everything else 
not directly associated with the physical product, for example, price, brand and origin 
(Japanese apples and Napa Valley wine).  
It is difficult to fully describe or classify goods because characteristics, both 
intrinsic and extrinsic, are hard to pin down precisely and vary when the state of the 
world changes. Incompletely defined goods or attributes often lead to incomplete 
property rights as it takes resources to define goods and allocate the rights to attributes. 
Opportunism can arise because rents associated with the undefined or poorly defined 
attributes and rights are available for taking or can be contested (North, 1990; Barzel, 
1989). This uncertainty inhibits exchange. Useful institutional arrangements can mitigate 
these transaction cost issues by better defining the attributes and, hence, lowering 
opportunism and transaction costs. In other words, these arrangements promote 
exchange. For example, third-party definition and certification of organic foods tend to 
promote the market for organic food by reducing asymmetric information on credence 
attributes. 
Some institutional arrangements may also focus on or create irrelevant credence 
attributes not valued by consumers. This opportunism can be seen in private exchange 
and also in the design, implementation, and enforcement of policy agreements (North, p. 
187). Opportunism can also arise and lead to increased transaction costs in exchange and, 
thus, inhibit exchange by introducing new required attributes, such as some arbitrary 
phyto-sanitary standards. This is done by policymakers to increase trade costs and 
prevent private agents from exchanging certain goods in order to protect competing 
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domestic industries. The dissertation involves three essays on food quality attributes and 
associated transaction costs in exchange. The three essays consider quality issues and 
investigate market complexities that arise due to differing product quality: first, from the 
aspect of consumer preference for domestic goods and the corresponding policy 
implications in the context of international trade; second, through the producers’ choice 
of promotion and quality-improving strategies in the context of different industrial 
structure; and third, in the consumers’ tradeoff between organic method (a credence 
quality attribute) and appearance (a search quality attribute) of fresh fruit.  The three 
essays and the relevant aspects of attributes and transaction costs are briefly summarized 
next. The essays themselves follow this introduction. 
          The first essay, “Tariff Equivalent of Technical Barriers to Trade with Imperfect 
Substitution and Trade Costs”, addresses the issue of food-quality attributes driven by 
protectionist policy that inhibits exchange between two countries. Technical barriers to 
trade based on phyto-sanitary standards affect food trade. Goods vary by heterogeneity in 
quality, origin of the good (imported versus domestic good), and consumers’ home-good 
preference.  Previous analyses of technical barriers to trade (TBT) have abstracted from 
differences in product quality and this leads to incorrect estimates of the tariff-
equivalence of a TBT and of its trade effects, and hence to erroneous trade policy 
prescriptions.  In particular, analysts often abstract from the heterogeneity of products’ 
quality is often abstracted or simply address the product difference by choosing “close” 
substitutes to approximate perfect substitution. Then a price-wedge approach (price 
difference between the border and home market) is used to quantify the impact of a TBT 
on market equilibrium and trade.  
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In general, price-wedge estimates rely on the assumption of homogeneous 
commodities and a price arbitrage condition. By assuming that domestic and imported 
goods are perfect substitutes, the gap between their prices reflects trade impediments 
from various policies and natural protection. However, in addition to the cost associated 
with the TBT, transportation and other transaction costs associated with marketing may 
prevent full arbitrage between the two prices (Head and Mayer, 2002). Instead, as 
developed in this essay, a revamped tariff-equivalent estimate of a TBT allows extending 
the price-wedge framework by first relaxing the homogeneous commodity assumption 
and accounting explicitly for commodity heterogeneity and perceived quality of 
substitutes. By systematically exploring the robustness of the tariff-equivalent estimate to 
underlying assumptions on commodity heterogeneity, home-good preference, trading 
costs, and the chosen reference data, the analysis shows the importance of selecting best 
values of these key determinants (substitution elasticity, home-good preference, and trade 
cost) on which the policy analysis can be centered. The sensitivity of the TBT estimate is 
evaluated around these central values of the determinants to derive associated welfare 
implications. 
The second essay, “How to Promote Quality Perception Wine Markets: Brand 
Advertising or Geographical Indications?” is concerned with the complex interaction 
between brand advertising (BA) and geographical indications (GI), and quality improving 
effort in the context of asymmetric information. The BA and GI convey extrinsic quality 
cues to consumers and the quality improving effort attempts to give intrinsic quality cues 
to consumers through their experience with the product. A parsimonious framework 
allows investigating the link between promotion and quality effort and market outcome. 
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In a two-period model, GI and BA enhance the quality perception and consumers’ 
willingness to pay. The BA allows a seller to develop an individual reputation. The GI 
allows sellers to share the promotion cost and to develop a common reputation. Besides 
the choice of GI or BA, producers choose whether or not to make an effort to improve the 
real average quality level. Both signal and effort strategies influence the seller’s profits. 
The second essay is linked to two separate strands of literature. The first strand of 
literature includes numerous papers on quality signaling. This research considers mainly 
prices (see for instance Mahenc, 2004) or advertising (see for instance, Fluet and Garella, 
2002) for signaling a higher quality. The framework developed here in the second essay 
differs by simplifying the consumers’ belief and considering GI and BA as persuasive 
tools that change consumers’ preferences. The second strand of literature is more recent 
(see for instance Marette and Crespi, 2003), and focuses on the GI only. In this literature, 
producers’ coordination or even price collusion via a GI may be necessary to improve 
quality when the fixed costs of certification or quality improvements are large. Here, in 
contrast, the framework differs by abstracting from any price collusion linked to the GI 
and introduces the possibility for producers to use brands. Broadly, the essay addresses 
the question of the efficiency of labels and professional groups compared to that of a 
private brand applied to the example of wine markets. The analysis shows that if the 
effort for improving quality is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on brand advertising 
for promoting its wine and set up its own reputation. Despite the sharing of the promotion 
cost, a geographical indication does not sufficiently reward the effort for improving 
quality because of the common reputation. Conversely, when the seller avoids the effort, 
the GI is selected. Firms take advantage of sharing of the promotion cost and collective 
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reputation.  
 The third essay, “Discounting Spotted Apples: Investigating Consumers’ 
Willingness to Accept Cosmetic Damage in an Organic Product”, addresses the 
interaction effect between organic attributes, an important credence (and intrinsic) 
attribute of food, and appearance, an important search (and extrinsic) attribute of food. 
Fresh food products such as apples were at one time provided as generic products, but are 
now differentiated by brand, variety, origin, appearance, as well as production and 
processing method.  
Empirical estimates of price variation due to quality factors date at least back to 
Waugh’s seminal study of quality factors affecting vegetable prices (Waugh, 1928). One 
of the most important quality factors is appearance. Appearance includes the intrinsic 
attributes of color, texture, and other visible differences. Most previous studies 
investigating consumer preference for organic foods assume that the organic products 
have similar cosmetic appearance as their conventionally produced counterparts (Blend 
and van Ravenswaay, 1999; and Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittlehammer 2001; Larue et 
al., 2004). Studies that focus on the effect of cosmetic problems find that consumers 
discount products with cosmetic damage (e.g. Thompson and Kidwell 1998, Roosen et al. 
1998 and Baker 1999). The referenced studies find a positive effect from organic 
production (or nonuse of pesticides) and a negative effect of cosmetic damage. However, 
less well understood is the nature of the tradeoff, whether the measured response to 
damage is sensitive to production method, and the effect of underlying consumer 
attitudes on production method, environmental issues and other quality attributes. 
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Analysis in the third essay is based on a fourth-price sealed-bid auction to elicit 
consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for organic and conventional apples with different 
levels of blemish. Principal component factor analysis and random effect models allow 
the analysis of how the WTP for apples is affected by quality attributes (conventional 
versus organic production methods, degree of blemish and their interaction), as well as 
interactions among consumers’ stated attitudes toward specific quality attributes (food 
safety concern, environmental concern, tolerance of pesticides, etc.), production method, 
degree of blemish, and consumers’ socio-demographic characteristics. Experimental 
results yield a WTP premium for organic apples, a discount for various levels of spots 
(the cosmetic damage), information on how the spot level affects the WTP for both 
organic and conventional apples, and how attitude and socio-demographic variables 
affect these premiums. Similar to the previous studies, the main effects show a tradeoff 
between production methods and cosmetic damage. However, in addition, the 
experimental design allows the estimation of interaction effects between production 
method and cosmetic damage, thus testing for the effect of cosmetic damage on the 
premium for organic production. 
The three essays are provided in the following chapters.  
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
The three essays address important quality issues in agricultural and food markets 
today and identify major findings. The rigorous investigation of the Japan-U.S. apple 
dispute in the first essay indicates the importance of accounting for quality heterogeneity, 
home-good preference, and trade costs in quantifying the effects on welfare and trade of 
the selected SPS regulation. Our finding of a strong home-preference for Japanese apples 
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is consistent with similar findings in other fresh markets (e.g., the US avocado case 
(Orden, 2005)). A striking result in the analysis of the apple dispute is that the increase in 
welfare and apple imports would be small following the removal of the arbitrary SPS 
policies.  The alleged damage in lost exports claimed by the United States at the WTO 
(U.S.$143.4 million) is substantially overstated. Much political goodwill has been spent 
on this dispute relative to the small size of the potential direct gains in agricultural 
exports. Ancillary benefits may exist if the United States eventually succeeds in opening 
the Japanese market and establishes a reputation as a persistent negotiator. Other 
countries or protected industries may pay attention to the United States’ resolve in 
opening markets and may refrain from engaging in costly disputes.  
The second essay explores wine producers’ choice between promotional strategies 
(branding and GI) and quality improvement strategies and how these strategic choices 
affect consumers’ wine purchasing decisions in the context of the international wine 
market. Although admittedly stylized, the model nonetheless highlights the complicated 
strategies for monitoring uncertain quality. The results show that the producers’ choice 
depends on the relative efficiency of promotional strategies compared with that of 
making an effort to improve quality. Another important result is that if the effort for 
improving quality is selected, a producer would like to use branding for promoting its 
wine and set up its own reputation rather than relying on a GI. In spite of its advantage in 
allowing producers to share the cost of promotion, a GI does not sufficiently reward the 
effort for improving quality since it promotes a collective reputation. In this aspect, 
France may have erred with its wine GI system that provides limited incentive to 
producers to improve the average quality of their products. Quality is the key to gaining 
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market share in the world wine market, one that has intense competition. So a reformed 
French policy should facilitate the emergence of branding or (branding combined with 
GIs) rather than GIs alone so as to reward producers for better products and eventually 
regain the country’s “dominance” in the international wine market.  Based on our model 
assumptions, however, brand advertising costs more than GIs to develop. The fragmented 
wine industry in France is composed of small individual producers lacking capital to do 
branding. Therefore, in the long run, a rationalization of French small wineries is a 
precondition to overcome their lack of capital and promote individual reputation.  
The third essay finds that consumers are willing to pay a premium for organic 
apples, but the premium for organic apples decreases as the level of spot damage 
increases. The negative effect of cosmetic damage offsets the positive effect of organic 
production. Consumers’ tolerance of cosmetic damage on apples is limited. This finding 
suggests the importance of quality attributes defined over cosmetic appearance as is the 
case today with the fruit grading system of the US Department of Agriculture, 
Agricultural Marketing Service, and as exists in many private contracts for produce. To a 
large extent, fresh fruit in US grocery stores have uniform appearance and the fruits with 
reduced appearance are often diverted as processed product such as to fruit juice and 
sauce. The finding of this essay indicates that even when there is no strict federal grading 
system, fresh fruit with cosmetic damage has little potential in today’s retail market due 
to consumers’ limited tolerance for reduced cosmetic attributes. Cosmetic damage also 
leads consumers to discount the premium they are willing to pay for the organic attribute. 
Even at relatively low levels of blemishes on the surface of organic apples, consumers 
preferred perfect looking conventional apples. The fact that consumers show little 
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tolerance for organic goods with poor appearance supports by the entry of large 
processors and retailers into the organic retail market. Retailers are likely to dictate 
uncompromised appearance from organic product suppliers. 
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CHAPTER 2.      TARIFF EQUIVALENT OF TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO 
TRADE WITH IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTION AND TRADE COSTS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The price-wedge method yields a tariff-equivalent estimate of technical 
barriers to trade (TBT). An extension of this method accounts for imperfect substitution 
between domestic and imported goods and incorporates recent findings on trade costs. 
We explore the sensitivity of this revamped TBT estimate to its key determinants 
(substitution elasticity, preference for home good, and trade cost). We use the augmented 
approach to investigate the recent Japan-U.S. apple trade dispute and find that removing 
the Japanese TBT would yield limited export gains to the United States. We then draw 
policy implications of our findings. 
 
Keywords: apple, dispute, Japan, SPS, TBT, technical barriers, trade, WTO 
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Introduction 
Article 20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits governments 
to set their own standards and regulations on trade in order to protect human, animal, or 
plant life or health, provided they do not discriminate among countries or use this motive 
as concealed protectionism. In addition, two specific World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements deal with food safety and animal and plant health, and with product 
standards: the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPSA) and the Technical 
Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBTA). The SPSA allows countries to set their own 
standards, but it requires that the standards should not arbitrarily discriminate between 
countries with similar conditions. The TBTA was generated to minimize unnecessary 
obstacles in regulations, standards, and testing and certification procedures. In practice, 
however, some governments use stricter health and safety regulations than necessary to 
isolate domestic producers from international competition. The stricter regulations may 
lead to questionable impediments to imports that compete with domestic products, in 
addition to the existing tariff barriers. When the possibility of a disease or pest 
transmission is very low or threat to food safety is small, these trade impediments often 
cause welfare losses for importing countries and mercantilist losses for exporting 
countries due to reduced exports. 
These issues have of course attracted the attention of economists (Anderson, 
McRae, and Wilson 2001; Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina 1998; Josling, Roberts, and 
Orden 2004; Roberts and Krissoff 2003). The growing literature on sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and other technical barriers to trade (TBT) often uses a 
price wedge approach1 to quantify the impact of a barrier on market equilibrium and trade, 
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(e.g., Calvin and Krissoff 1998; Campbell and Gossette 1994). Although not unique or 
sophisticated, the method has been legitimized in the economics literature with some 
prescriptions and qualifiers to account for transportation cost and quality differences 
(Baldwin 1991; Deardorff and Stern 1998). The use of a price-wedge approach often 
abstracts from quality differences or simply addresses the difference by choosing “close” 
substitutes. Transportation costs may be reduced to the differential between cost-
insurance-freight and free-on-board (CIF-FOB) prices and abstract from the internal 
transportation cost once imports are landed. All price-wedge estimates of which we are 
aware rely on the assumption of homogeneous commodities and a price arbitrage 
condition. By assuming that domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes, the gap 
between their prices reflects trade impediments from various policies and natural 
protection. Border tariffs and transportation and transaction costs prevent full arbitrage 
between the two prices (Head and Mayer 2002). Hence, in principle, the price gap can 
yield an estimate of the tariff equivalent of the TBT once transportation and trade costs 
and other impediments have been taken into account. 
In this article we derive a revamped tariff-equivalent estimate of a TBT. We 
extend the price-wedge framework by first relaxing the homogeneous commodity 
assumption, a straightforward but instrumental step overlooked in the literature on TBT 
measurement. We account explicitly for commodity heterogeneity and perceived quality 
of substitutes. Next, we incorporate recent developments and findings on large and costly 
border effects arising from transportation, linguistic differences, and poor infrastructure 
and law enforcement (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004; Head and Mayer; Hummels and 
Skiba 2004). Two major findings of this new literature are particularly relevant to our 
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work. First, trading costs are very large and often greater than policy impediments and 
cannot be ignored. While CIF-FOB ratios have fallen over time, other transportation and 
trade costs have remained high and have been underestimated. Second, these costs are 
structured on a per-unit basis rather than following the so-called iceberg method;2 they 
act as a specific tariff rather than an ad valorem tax (Hummels and Skiba). These per-unit 
costs shift supply in a parallel manner rather than proportionally, which influences the 
estimate of the TBT. We provide a consistent approach to apportion the internal-border 
price difference between potential sources of the difference (quality and heterogeneity of 
goods, border tariff, TBT, transportation and other transaction costs). This approach 
allows us to elucidate the respective role of each source leading to a credible estimate of 
the tariff equivalent of the TBT.  
We systematically explore the robustness of the tariff-equivalent estimate to 
underlying assumptions on commodity heterogeneity, home-good preference, trading 
costs, and the chosen reference data. We show the importance of selecting best values of 
these key determinants (substitution elasticity, home-good preference, and trade cost) on 
which the policy analysis can be centered. We then analyze the sensitivity of the TBT 
estimate around these central values of the determinants and associated welfare 
implications. The analysis shows the value of narrowing the set of possible estimates of 
the TBT using available data and knowledge on the quality and heterogeneity of the 
domestic and competing imported goods. 
Our article bridges two methods often used to estimate the trade effects of TBTs: 
the tariff-equivalent–price-wedge approach mentioned previously and the gravity-
equation approach.3 Recent conceptual developments have provided theoretical 
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foundations to the gravity-equation approach and account explicitly for relative prices of 
traded and domestic substitutes and for trading costs. In addition, they attempt to better 
measure and decompose “border effects” of trade barriers and transportation costs 
between trade partners. These new approaches have been applied to aggregate trade data 
but not to individual commodities (Anderson and van Wincoop; Head and Mayer).  
Calvin and Krissoff provide a tariff equivalent of phytosanitary barriers in the 
Japanese apple market regarding the risk of contamination by fire blight that has been the 
origin of a long WTO dispute between the U.S. and Japan (WTO 2002; 2003a-e; 2004a-
d; 2005). The dispute has attracted much attention. Calvin and Krissoff use the law of one 
price under a homogeneous commodity assumption (arbitrage condition) to calculate the 
tariff equivalent of SPS barriers affecting apple imports in Japan to avoid damages from 
fire blight. By assuming that Japan’s domestic and imported apples are perfect 
substitutes, the gap between the prices of domestic and imported apples accounts for the 
border tariff and other trade impediments that prevent full arbitrage. The latter authors 
also abstract from other border effects (internal transportation and transaction costs), 
leading to a likely overstatement of the cost of a TBT barrier, other things being equal. 
They rely on several reference years to mitigate annual variations in the reference data 
used to calibrate the tariff equivalent to the TBTs. Using recent data and the proposed 
revamped approach, we provide a new investigation of the Japan-U.S. apple dispute. We 
compute the tariff equivalent of Japanese TBT regulations affecting apple trade and 
quantify the impact of removing these policies on welfare and apple trade flows. We also 
draw policy implications. The apple dispute offers an opportunity to validate our 
contention that departures from perfect substitution, and significant trade costs have a 
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substantial impact on the estimate of SPS/TBT regulation and hence on welfare and 
policy implications derived from this estimate. 
Analytical Framework 
As in the gravity equation, we use the simple constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
model to incorporate the heterogeneity of goods in consumers’ preferences and 
eventually to calculate the tariff equivalent estimate of a TBT (Hummels and Skiba). 
Define domestic and imported apples, D and I. We assume the case of a small country 
facing a parametric exogenous world price of imports. The price pD of the domestic good 
is determined by the domestic good market equilibrium, as explained later in the article. 
The representative consumer maximizes utility U subject to a budget constraint:  
(1) AOGIDIDUMax
ID
+−+= ρρρ αα /1
,
))1((),(  + + =D I Ts.t. p D p I AOG M , 
where TM  is expenditure on all goods; ρα ,  are parameters reflecting preferences; and 
pD and pI are consumer prices of the two goods D and I. AOG is the aggregate numeraire 
good. Home-good preference implies α > ½. The corresponding indirect utility function 
deriving from consuming apples is 
(2) 1
1
11* ))1()((),,( −−− −+−= σσσσσ αα IDTID ppAOGMMppV , 
and the corresponding expenditure function is 
(3) 
1
* 1 1 1( , , ) ( )( (1 ) )D I D Ie p p u u AOG p p
σ σ σ σ σα α− − −= − + − . 
The associated Marshallian demand functions are 
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with 1
1
σ ρ= −  being the elasticity of substitution and 
*AOG being the optimal 
consumption amount of the numeraire. Parameter α functions as a quality shift (Hummels 
and Klenow 2004), which lowers the effective price of D and increases its consumption, 
other things being equal. It has the opposite effects on I, increasing its effective price and 
decreasing its consumption. Observable price-quantity pairs and some additional 
information to select α and σ can be used to infer the tariff-equivalent estimate of the 
TBT and the interface between α and the tariff-equivalent estimate of the TBT.  
The TBT first leads to a higher marginal cost of production because of orchard 
and harvest inspections and buffer requirements (measured as 1TBT ). This first part of the 
TBT leads to a higher unit cost and price of apples exported to Japan relative to other 
export markets for the same apple type (size-88 extra-fancy waxed Fuji type) , because of 
a shift in the marginal cost for the apples going to Japan (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster 
2005). The export unit cost to Japan is 1TBTpUS + , where price pUS4  represents the 
price/unit cost of the same U.S. apple type but going elsewhere than Japan. In addition, 
strict inspection requirements, vendor and ordering issues and additional requirements are 
added to the imported price once the apples are landed in Japan. Variable 2TBT  
represents these costs in the market channel, which have been noted in the case of Japan 
(Gehrt et al. 2005). Therefore the import price Ip  is expressed as  
(5) 1 2I US R R US T R Rp p TBT TBT IT Tariff T p TBT IT Tariff T= + + + + + = + + + + , 
where RIT is the insurance and freight and other international trade costs of apples 
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exported to Japan, Tariff  is the specific import tariff, RT  is the per-unit transportation 
and transaction cost from the harbor to the internal wholesale market, and TBTT is the 
tariff equivalent of the two components of the TBT (TBTT = TBT1 + TBT2), respectively.  
If all of variables other than TBTT in equation (5) were observable, it would be 
straightforward to measure TBTT. However, since the relevant pI cannot be observed 
directly, we can infer a value for pI from pD using some assumptions about preferences 
and behavior and data on D and I. One simplifying assumption could be that domestic 
and imported goods are perfect substitutes, but the contribution here is to address the case 
where they are not.  From utility maximization, we know that the marginal rate of 
substitution is equal to the relative price of the substitute goods or  
(6) 
RRTUS
D
I
D
I
D
TTariffITTBTp
p
p
p
MU
MUMRS ++++=== , 
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution, and MUj indicates the marginal utility of 
good j. From (6), the tariff equivalent of the TBT, TTBT , is solved after deriving the MRS 
from (1) and substituting it back into (6). TTBT  is a function of the relative cost of the 
two goods, their volumes, the elasticity of substitution, the preference parameter, 
international trade costs, internal transaction and transportation cost, and border tariff: 5,6  
(7) RRUSDT TTariffITpI
DpTBT −−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= σα
α 11 . 
Equation (7) nests the conventional technique that assumes perfect substitutes 
leading to the TBT in order to explain the differential between the domestic price and 
international price adjusted for transportation. To see this assume α = ½ and let σ → ∞.7 
Then the tariff-equivalent estimate of the TBT is ( )T D US R RTBT p p IT T Tariff= − − + − . If 
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the tariff and TBT are removed, the latter expression will lead to two arbitrage conditions 
pD =pI = pCIF + TR, and pCIF =pUS + ITR. In real life the two prices pD and pI would differ 
because of quality differences and imperfect substitutability. To measure the sensitivity 
of TTBT  to preference/quality, imperfect substitutability, and transportation cost we 
compute the sensitivity elasticities of the TBT estimate with respect to σ , α , and 
transportation cost in the empirical section.  
For the welfare analysis, we use the usual Equivalent Variation (EV) measure of 
the consumer’s welfare, with 010 ),~( mupeEV −= , where ),(~ ID ppp =  and subscripts 0 
and 1 indicate initial and new prices. 
We use a small displacement model to determine the price of domestic apples and 
eventually infer the impact of removing the TBT barrier on imports and domestic market 
equilibrium. Let S be the retail supply of domestic apples, which is an increasing function 
of domestic apple price and exogenous parameter λ:  
(8) = SεD DS( p ,λ ) λp , 
where εS represents the own-price elasticity of the domestic apple supply. Decreases in 
parameter λ would reflect upward shifts in supply if contamination occurs and induces an 
increase in the cost of production. Using equations (4) and (8) the equilibrium domestic 
price eDp  and quantity are determined by market equilibrium condition, or 
(9) =e eD I DD( p , p ) S( p ,λ ) . 
Equations (4), (7), and (8), and condition (9) constitute the model. With the 
elimination of the TBT, Ip  decreases and pD will fall if there is no risk of contamination 
from the increased imports. The demand for domestic products declines with the change 
in pI. Then the domestic market adjusts at a lower price such that demand equals supply. 
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Imports expand as the direct effect of the decrease in the import price is larger than the 
feedback effect of the lower domestic price, by stability. If contamination occurs, the 
price of domestic apples may not decrease as the domestic supply shifts upward to reflect 
the increased cost from contamination. The domestic apple equilibrium quantity is further 
reduced by the contamination. Imports increase. For simplicity, we assume away 
feedback effects from apple suppliers into the income of the representative consumer. We 
turn next to our investigation of the Japan-U.S. apple dispute starting with some key 
stylized facts on the dispute. 
The Japan-U.S. Apple Dispute 
The high technical barriers to importing apples into Japan have brought repeated 
complaints from several exporting countries and have led to a 30-year dispute (Elms 
2004). The latest episode of this dispute has taken place within the WTO. Japan-
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (WTO 2002; 2003a-e; 2004a-d; 2005) 
relates to the United States’ complaint about the Japanese requirements imposed on 
apples imported from the United States and their inconsistency with WTO principles. The 
prohibitions and requirements included, for example, the prohibition of imported apples 
from states other than designated areas in Oregon and Washington; the prohibition of 
imported apples from any orchard (whether it is free of fire blight or not) if fire blight 
was detected within a 500-meter buffer zone surrounding such orchard; the requirement 
that export orchards be inspected three times a year (at blossom, fruitlet, and harvest 
stages) to check if fire blight is present in order to apply the afore-mentioned 
prohibitions; the requirement that at the post-harvest stage, apples for export to Japan be 
separated from fruits for export to other markets; and chlorination of apples for export 
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to Japan.  
In 1997, the United States requested that Japan modify its import restrictions on 
apples based on published scientific evidence that mature, symptomless apples are not 
carriers of fire blight. In 2000, the United States agreed to carry out joint research 
proposed by Japan to confirm the results of those earlier studies. The USDA’s 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) conducted the joint research. The research results confirmed that 
mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire blight. This finding provided 
additional scientific support for the U.S. position. Since the results of this research were 
released in February 2001, the U.S. government has repeatedly pressured Japan to modify 
its import restrictions. After extensive bilateral discussions with USDA scientists, Japan 
refused to modify its import restrictions in October 2001. 
In March 2002, the United States requested WTO consultations concerning 
Japan’s import restrictions on U.S. apples. Consultations in April 2002 failed to settle the 
dispute. In May 2002, the United States requested that the WTO establish a panel to 
consider the Japanese restrictions. In June 2002, a panel was established by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO to consider this issue. Before the Panel, the United 
States claimed that Japan was acting inconsistently with some articles of the SPSA, 
certain articles of the Agreement on Agriculture, and the so-called “GATT 1994.” In July 
2003, the Panel found that Japan’s phytosanitary measures were maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence and inconsistent with Japan’s obligation, did not qualify as a 
provisional measure, and were not based on a risk assessment. In September 2003, Japan 
appealed the WTO Panel ruling. In addition to Japan’s appeal, the United States cross-
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appealed the Panel Report. At the same time, third participants, such as Australia, Brazil, 
the European Union, and New Zealand, filed their submissions. After more 
investigations, in November 2003, the DSB upheld the findings of July 2003. Therefore, 
the Appellate Body recommended that the DSB request that Japan bring its inconsistent 
measures into conformity with SPSA.  
Half a year later, in July 2004, the United States held that Japan failed to comply 
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by the end of the reasonable period of 
time. Therefore, the United States requested that the DSB establish a panel and 
simultaneously requested authorization on suspension of concessions and other 
obligations in one or more of the following: tariff concessions and related obligations 
under the GATT 1994 on a list of products; and concessions and other obligations under 
the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. Because Japan objected to the 
United States’ suspension request, this matter has been referred to arbitration. The 
arbitration Panel’s report of June 2005 mostly sided with U.S. arguments. In August 
2005, Japan issued a protocol agreeable to the United States, which removed measures 
that had been deemed inconsistent with WTO principles (WTO 2005). 
Between 1971 and 1992, Japan imported only 4,500 boxes of apples, all from 
South Korea and North Korea. In June of 1993, Japan permitted some import of New 
Zealand apples. After that, the United States and Australia also exported apples to Japan 
but not continuously over time. New Zealand, EU, and Korean apples have fire blight or 
a related form. Australia and Chile have been free of fire blight. Although Japan opened 
its door to foreign apples meeting the SPS and TBT standards regarding fire blight, the 
importing quantity has been quite low compared with the domestic production. As shown 
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in table 1, the import shares never exceeded 0.35% between 2000 and 2002, the last 
period prior the constitution of the dispute panel. The low import share is partly due to 
the high tariff and TBT barrier increasing the cost of exporting to Japan.  
In addition to the high technical barrier referred to in the dispute, the higher 
quality of the domestic product cannot be neglected. Fruits in general and apples in 
particular are an important part of the Japanese diet (Huang 2004). Japanese consumers 
exhibit a strong home-good preference relative to imported apples. This fact has been 
repeatedly established (American University n.d.; Kajikawa 1998; Shim, Gehrt, and Lotz 
2002; USDA 1997). According to Japanese consumers, domestic apples have a higher 
quality because of their sweeter flavor and bigger size. For instance, after Japan opened 
its apple market to imports in 1995, U.S. apples entered Japan at much lower prices than 
Japanese domestic products. However, after an initial success, the sales of U.S. apples 
declined because Japanese consumers complained that U.S. apples were too sour and did 
not cater to Japanese taste (American University n.d.). Japanese consumers prefer apples 
with brix (a measure of sugar level) in a certain range and a specific brix-to-acid ratio, 
but imported apples do not meet these requirements. In addition, imports are smaller in 
size and less juicy (Kajikawa). For Japanese consumers who believe that apples must 
have an appropriate brix and acid level, firmness, juice, size, and flavor, imported apples 
cannot be a perfect substitute for domestic products.  
Japanese farmers produce apples with great care and the production of apples is 
labor intensive. Leaves near each apple are usually plucked away when the fruit is still on 
the tree, which ensures that the apple receives enough and balanced sunlight to ensure 
full ripening. Several weeks before harvesting, bags are used to protect individual apples 
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in order to prevent any kind of surface marring. This labor-intensive production leads to a 
higher quality and at the same time comes at a higher cost. Because of the quality 
difference and trade barriers, Japanese producers are able to pass the higher costs to 
consumers in the form of a higher price. Hence, the trade barriers do not explain the 
entire price wedge. A price differential reflecting the quality premium would remain 
under free trade. In addition, as a fresh fruit, the internal transportation cost for apples is 
high and cannot be ignored. 
Quantifying the Apple Dispute 
We apply the framework developed in section 2 to imported apples in Japan. We use all 
imported apples to estimate I and the average import unit cost measured as the CIF price, 
shown in table 1, and to compute the tariff equivalent of the Japanese TBT regulations. 8  
Then we estimate the impact of eliminating the TBT. The transportation and transaction 
cost including both international and internal cost, ITR+TR, is approximately 78.33 yen/kg 
(Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster). The tariff rate is listed in table 2 in specific form (17% of 
pCIF). We analyze long and short run impacts. As in Calvin and Krissoff, the long-run 
supply elasticity of domestic apples is assumed to be 1, whereas the short-run supply 
elasticity is assumed to be 0.1. We use Washington State size 88 waxed extra fancy Fuji 
apples as apples similar to those exported to Japan and take their price as the USp  
(USDA, AMS n.d.). Regarding pest and disease transmission, we follow the estimate of 
the Queensland (Australia) Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (Queensland 
Government) and assume that with the transmission of pest and disease the production of 
apples would decrease by a fixed proportion of 20%. We use 2SLS to estimate the 
parameter values for σ  and α  with monthly data for the period 2000-2004 (see Yue, 
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Beghin, Jensen 2006). The estimated result forσ  is 7.12 (s.d.=2.09); the estimated result 
forα  is 0.64 (s.d. = 0.05).9  
TBT Estimate and Sensitivity Analysis 
The last two columns of table 2 show the actual tariff (in yen/kg) and (specific) tariff 
equivalent of the TBT across different reference years when σ  and α  are assigned to be 
7.12 and 0.64 respectively.  
To test the sensitivity of TTBT  to the elasticity of substitution σ  and domestic 
preference/quality parameterα , we assign the central values of their estimates and 
consider their confidence intervals (central values plus/minus one and then two standard 
deviations). The TBTT estimates are shown in table 3. We also computed values for TBTT 
under the assumption of perfect substitution (σ=∞; α=1/2) with and without trading costs, 
as this latter simplifying assumption is the focus of our enquiry. As shown in table 3, in 
this case accounting for trading costs (ITR and TR) yields an estimate of the TBT that is 
negative (TBTT= -11.4). This result shows the potential pitfall of abstracting from quality 
differences. Abstracting from these trading costs (ITR =TR = 0), the TBT estimate under 
the homogeneous good assumption is positive (62.48yen/kg), but much smaller than 
implied by the TBT estimates computed under the proper assumptions of imperfect 
substitution and positive trading costs as shown in table 3. Although these two 
assumptions work in opposite directions, they do not offset each other as shown in the 
table. As parameters α and σ  increase, the TBT estimate decreases, holding everything 
else constant, and eventually becomes undefined, that is, becomes negative. 
Table 4 gives the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to σ  (i.e., σε ), holding α  
constant. Measures of σε  show that TTBT  is sensitive to σ , especially when the value of 
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σ  is low (poor substitutes). For example, when σ =2.94, σε  is less than -1.35, a value 
which indicates TTBT  would differ a lot even if the change in σ  were to be small. Thus, 
σ  plays an important role in the calculation of TTBT . When σ  gets larger, the sensitivity 
decreases in absolute value. When σ =11.3, the sensitivity is about a fourth of what it is 
for σ =2.94. A similar sensitivity was also noted in computing the consumer tax 
equivalent of a tariff with imperfect substitutes (Salerian, Davis and Jomini). 
Table 4 also gives the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to α  (holding σ  constant); 
TTBT  is highly sensitive to α  for the smaller values of α, but this sensitivity decreases as 
α increases. It is about 4 times smaller for (in absolute value) α=0.74 compared to 
α=0.54. Good information on α appears to be critical in estimating TTBT . This fact has 
implications for gravity equation analyses, which often impose α =0.5. This restriction 
may strongly bias the estimates of impediments to trade as the sensitivity of TBTT with 
respect to α is at its highest at α = 0.5. 
Estimates of the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to transportation cost RT + RIT  
show that TTBT  is sensitive to RT + RIT  when the latter gets large but goes to zero as 
RT + RIT  decreases (detailed estimates available from the authors). Around the central 
value (78.33 yen/kg) used in our computation, the elasticity of TTBT  to RT + RIT  is 
approximately -0.18 and hence plays some role in the calculation of the TTBT , although 
less crucial than the taste parameters do. The elasticity of TTBT  with respect to the 
domestic and imported quantities shows TTBT  is less sensitive to the domestic and 
imported quantities than it is to their prices. The moderate elasticities remain nearly 
constant as quantity levels (D and I) change. In contrast, the elasticity of TTBT  with 
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respect to the domestic price is always greater than one and gets larger as the domestic 
price increases. The elasticity of TTBT  with respect to Tariff indicates that the sensitivity 
of TTBT  increases as the value of the tariff increases, although all of the estimated values 
are less than 0.45 (in absolute value) for Tariff and range from 18.7 to 46.8 yen/kg. 
Welfare Analysis of the TBT (and Tariff) Removal 
The import increases induced by policy reforms are shown in table 5 for different values 
of σ  and α . By eliminating the TBT (alone and along with the border tariff elimination), 
apple imports would increase substantially, between 5.24 and 218.11 103 MT, depending 
on home good preference parameter α  and the assumed elasticity of substitution. These 
magnitudes are in a range of values comparable to those of Calvin and Krissoff (1998) 
although our central case shows smaller imports than theirs. These larger imports remain 
moderate relative to domestic apple consumption. Japan imports apples from Australia, 
New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States and the U.S. share of apple imports by 
Japan has varied widely over time. The removal of the TBT benefits the United States 
and all exporting countries which are not fire blight free (e.g., New Zealand). New 
exporters such as China may enter the Japanese market as entry is eased by the removal 
of the TBT (and the tariff). In 2000, the value share of U.S. apples into total apple 
imports was 24%. Based on the 2000 share, by elimination of both the TBT and the tariff, 
the expansion of U.S. imports by Japan would only amount to U.S.$4.01 million when 
σ =7.12 and α =0.64, and would not exceed U.S.$75.73 million, if one assumes σ =2.94 
and α =0.54.10  The losses to U.S. exporters and producers would be smaller than the 
value of imports, first because they would be valued at lower FOB prices and farm gate 
prices, respectively, and because producer surplus losses are always smaller than the 
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gross value of forgone production opportunities. The U.S.$75.73 million figure is about 
half of the lost exports claimed by the United States at the WTO (U.S.$143.4 million).  
Changes in welfare with elimination of the TBT and the tariff vary under different 
assumptions on the transmission of disease. Table 6 shows the welfare implications of 
eliminating the TBT and the tariff for 2000, when assigning different values to α  and σ , 
assuming transportation plus transaction costs of 78.33 yen/kg, 1=sε  (long run 
response), and under the condition of no disease transmission. The table shows that the 
EV and the producer’s surplus change dramatically with the changes of σ  and α . 
However, when there is no disease transmission, EV net of tariff revenue loss is greater 
than the loss of the producer’s surplus for both elimination of the TBT and elimination of 
the TBT and the tariff no matter what values σ  and α  take.  
Transmission of disease implies an upward shift of the domestic supply of apples 
because the variable cost of producing apples has increased. Table 7 shows the welfare 
implications with disease transmission holding other conditions the same as in the 
previous analysis. When σ =7.12 and α =0.54, the net welfare is positive. So it is optimal 
to eliminate either the TBT or both the TBT and tariff in this case. But when the value of 
α  is equal to or larger than 0.64, EV plus the change in tariff revenues do not exceed the 
loss of producer’s surplus and net welfare consequences of the reform are negative no 
matter what value σ  takes on. So the elimination of the TBT may not improve welfare. 
The same logic applies to the case when both the TBT and the tariff are eliminated.  
Table 8 gives the short-run welfare implications of policy reforms for the case 
without disease transmission when supply of domestic apples is assumed to be very 
inelastic ( 1.0=sε ). Supply expansion of fruit trees takes time, although at the margin 
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apples can be moved from one use to another (from processing to fresh market) on short 
notice. Supply contraction is more responsive since apples can be removed from the 
market and stored. In any case it is interesting to consider the implications of less price-
responsive supply of domestic apples. As expected the decrease in domestic price caused 
by the domestic demand shift is more pronounced with this steeper domestic supply 
curve. Accordingly, EV (columns (2) and (4)) increases relative to its level in the long-
run case; imports and associated tariff revenues (column (1)) do not expand as much; and 
the loss of producer surplus is more acute with this inelastic supply. Net welfare gains are 
mitigated by the larger losses of producer surplus. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the variation of estimates of long-run net welfare and 
import effects from removing the TBT as σ  and α  change and without disease 
transmission. The net welfare is EV plus change in tariff revenue net of loss of producer’s 
surplus. The transparent horizontal plate is the zero plate, provided for reference. Figures 
1 and 2 show that the net welfare import expansion increase as σ  and α  decrease. They 
decrease faster when σ  and α  are smaller (the surfaces are concave toward the origin 
(σ =α =0)). The net welfare eventually approaches zero when σ  and α take on larger 
values. 
Conclusions 
 
Differences between prices of domestic goods and those of corresponding imported 
goods could come from four sources: tariffs, other barriers (TBTs), quality differences, 
and marketing costs (associated with taking the products from the exporting market to the 
border of importing countries and from the border to the equivalent internal market). In 
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this article we have developed a methodology to apportion the price difference among 
these four sources.  
Our analysis suggests four generic steps in this apportioning. First, stylized facts 
and data must be gathered to measure the price difference, the existence of barriers 
(TBTs, tariffs), and consumer preferences with respect to the domestic and the competing 
imported goods and their respective perceived quality. An important second step is to 
formalize and parameterize this quality difference. We specified CES preferences, 
derived a simple demand system for domestic and imported apples and estimated the 
elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic apples in the Japanese markets, 
as well as the preference parameter for domestic apples. As an alternative, one could 
borrow estimates of these taste parameters if they were available (which they were not in 
our case). A third step combines the data, the estimates and computes the estimate of the 
TBT as a function of the market data, price difference, elasticity of substitution, home 
preference parameter, and transportation costs. In a fourth step, sensitivity analysis is 
undertaken around the preferred values of the parameters to gauge the plausibility of the 
estimated TBT.  
Through this methodology, we revamped the tariff equivalent of a TBT by 
relaxing the homogeneous commodity assumption, accounting for perceived quality of 
substitutes and trade costs. The latter are often larger than policy impediments and cannot 
be abstracted from them. Transportation and trade costs are structured on a per-unit basis 
rather than being ad-valorem. Specific (as opposed to proportional) trade costs reduce the 
variability of the estimate of TBT with respect to the variability of import unit value 
across different reference years. Their influence on the TBT estimate is mitigated as the 
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import unit value increases. Trade costs and imperfect substitution have offsetting 
influences in the computation of the estimate of the TBT. Since most previous 
applications have ignored these two aspects, these previous applications have somewhat 
mitigated the error implied by the two simplifications and dissimulated the inherent 
sensitivity of the TBT estimate to each of these underlying parameters.  
The rigorous investigation of the Japan-U.S. apple dispute first validates the 
approach and indicates the importance of empirical estimates of the magnitude of 
preferences (α and σ) which we estimated econometrically. We then explored the 
sensitivity of the tariff equivalent estimate of the TBT with respect to these two 
parameters, varying their value around the central estimates we had obtained. The TBT 
estimate and welfare analysis based on it are sensitive to these parameters. The sensitivity 
to the consumers’ home preference has some implications for gravity equation models 
that impose restrictions of equal preference/quality for imported and domestic goods. 
These models are likely to provide biased measures of trade impediments and should 
relax this assumption.  
More importantly, our research raises interesting policy implications. A striking 
result in the analysis of the apple dispute is that the increase in apple imports would be 
small (in value) no matter what parameter estimates are used. It appears that the alleged 
damage in lost exports claimed by the United States at the WTO (U.S.$143.4 million) is 
substantially overstated. If the price of exported U.S. apples was endogenous (increasing 
in exports), welfare gains to Japanese consumers of removing the TBT would be 
somewhat mitigated by the higher border prices of U.S. apples; the U.S. export expansion 
would be even smaller than stated in our analysis. A positive producer surplus could be 
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computed for U.S. suppliers. Thus our analysis provides an upper bound on the welfare 
gains to Japan and the export expansion potential for the U.S. but without a U.S. 
surplus measure.  
The political economy of the case is also intriguing. Much political goodwill has 
been spent on this dispute relative to the small size of the potential direct gains in 
agricultural exports. Ancillary benefits may exist if the United States eventually succeeds 
in opening the Japanese market and establishes a reputation as a persistent negotiator. 
Other countries or protected industries may pay attention to the United States’ resolve in 
opening markets and may refrain from engaging in costly disputes.  
 
Footnotes 
1. The price wedge measures the difference between the internal price of a good and the 
reference price of a comparable good, such as a border price. It attributes the price 
difference to trade barriers and transportation cost. The price wedge can be expressed as a 
specific tax/tariff, or an ad valorem tax/tariff (Beghin and Bureau 2001).  
2. The iceberg method refers to transportation cost being proportional to the value of a 
good. To export a unit value of a good it takes (1+x) unit value of that good to be shipped 
out. Transportation cost is equal to fraction x of the unit value of the good and “melts” 
away. (Note that x is nonnegative and can be made a function of distance traveled.) 
3. The gravity equation approach links trade flows between two countries to observable 
variables such as their relative income, and to variables inhibiting trade such as distance, 
linguistic barriers and trade policy barriers (Anderson and van Wincoop). 
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4. For simplicity, USp  is assumed to be exogenous to the importer, implying a horizontal 
export supply and no producer surplus measure for the exporter. The price can easily be 
endogenized as an increasing function of importing quantity to reflect an upward-sloping 
export supply of U.S. apples. 
5. Other functional forms (other than the CES) can be used. They lead to slightly 
different specifications of equation (7). The CES is flexible with a wide range of possible 
substitution between D and I. To illustrate alternatives, a linear- expenditure system 
(LES) specification leads to 
1
1
1 ( )
1 ( )
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D D
T D US R R
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I
DTBT p p IT Tariff T
I
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αα γ
−
−
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, 
with minimum subsistence parameters γj and preference parameters αj (j = D, I) to be 
identified with extraneous information. 
6. The ad valorem tariff equivalent is 
1
% 1 USD
T R R
CIF CIF
pp DTBT it t t
p I p
σα
α
− ⎛ ⎞= − − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , where 
itR is the ad valorem tariff equivalent of international transportation, insurance and 
transaction cost, t  is the ad valorem tariff, and tR is the internal transportation and 
transaction cost. 
7. We thank a referee for suggesting this nesting. 
8. In an alternative specification, we treat imports from different countries as imperfect 
substitutes using a double-nested CES model and calculate the TBT estimate. Results are 
quite similar to what we present in this article. For example, when we assume α =0.64, 
the elasticity of substitution among imports as 10, and σ =7.12, %TTBT is 65%, which is 
quite close to the 60% level obtained by aggregating all imports into one good. 
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9. Shim, Gehrt, and Lotz provide an implicit value of α =0.55 based on a survey of 
Japanese housewives on their preferences of U.S. and Japanese apples. The latter 
estimate is smaller than our econometric estimate but within its confidence interval. As 
we use total apple imports to derive our econometric estimate of α, this difference in data 
(all imports versus U.S. apple imports) may contribute to the difference in the estimates 
of α. We abstract from the consideration that α depends on the TBT and could decrease if 
the TBT was removed. 
10. The incremental U.S.$4.01 million of U.S. imports come from the 2000 U.S. value 
share of all apple imports by Japan, or 22,249,000/92,630,000=24%, applied to the 
expansion in import value (11.56 103 MT *155.91 yen/kg), expressed in U.S.$ with an 
exchange rate of 107.765 yen/$. 
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Table 1. Japanese Apple Production and Imports 
Source: Japan Customs, USDA.  
Note: MT denotes metric tons. USp  is price of Washington State size-88 waxed extra-
fancy Fuji apples; CIFp is the average CIF price of imported apples; I is quantity of all 
imported apples; Dp  is the wholesale price of domestic apples; D is the quantity of 
domestic apples in wholesale market.  
 
 
 
Domestic Wholesale Import  
 
 
Year 
 
Domestic 
Production 
(MT) 
Quantity  
D  
(MT) 
Price 
Dp  
(yen/kg) 
 
Quantity I 
(MT) 
CIF Price
CIFp  
(yen/kg) 
 
 
USP  
(yen/kg) 
 
 
Import 
Share 
2000 799600 691600 238 594 156 149 0.09% 
2001 930700 674600 246 2339 126 129 0.35% 
2002 925800 768700 182 120 237 139 0.02% 
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Table 2. TTBT  Across Different Years (σ =7.12, α =0.64) 
Year 
Tariff 
(yen/kg) 
TTBT
a 
(yen/kg) 
2000 26.52 93.86 
2001 21.47 71.02 
2002 40.29 92.87 
Source: WTO schedules and Japan Customs. 
a The ad valorem estimated values of %TTBT  for the three years are 60%, 56%, and 
39% respectively. 
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Table 3. TTBT  Under Different Values of σ  and α  
 
α  
 
σ  T
TBT  
(yen/kg) 
0.50 ∞  -11.4 
2.94 1970.68 
5.03 558.07 
7.12 279.48 
9.21 169.38 
0.54 
11.3 111.70 
2.94 1558.44 
5.03 406.07 
7.12 178.81 
9.21 88.99 
 
0.59 
 
11.30 41.93 
2.94 1210.61 
5.03 277.83 
7.12 93.86 
9.21 21.16 
0.64 
11.3 --- 
2.94 913.19 
5.03 168.16 
7.12 21.23 
9.21 --- 
0.69 
11.30 --- 
2.94 655.96 
5.03 73.32 
7.12 --- 
9.21 --- 
0.74 
11.30 --- 
 
Note: Analysis is for year 2000. Bold font denotes central values of α and σ. The shaded 
area denotes the central case (σ =7.12, α =0.64); --- denotes TBTT negative, which is of 
no economic meaning. 
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Table 4. Elasticity of TTBT  with Respect to σ  andα  
 
σ  σ
ε  
(α =0.64) 
 
α  α
ε  
(σ =7.12) 
2.94 -1.351 0.54 -2.376 
4.33 -0.917 0.57 -1.885 
5.72 -0.694 0.60 -1.508 
7.12 -0.558 0.64 -1.130 
8.52 -0.466 0.67 -0.913 
9.92 -0.400 0.70 -0.737 
11.3 -0.351 0.74 -0.551 
 
Note: Analysis is for year 2000. The shaded area denotes the results for central value of 
parameters. 
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Table 5. Increase in Imports (103 MT) with the Elimination of TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1=sε ) 
 
α  
 
σ  
Increase in Imports 
by Elimination of TBT 
Increase in Imports 
by Elimination of TBT and Tariff
2.94 174.46 218.11 
7.12 71.15 118.26 
 
0.54 
 11.30 29.95 70.77 
2.94 75.40 98.79 
7.12 5.24 11.56 
 
0.64 
 11.30 --- --- 
2.94 22.28 30.20 
7.12 --- --- 
 
0.74 
 11.30 --- --- 
 
Note: Analysis is for year 2000. The shaded area denotes the central case. 
 --- denotes TBTT is negative, which is of no economic meaning. 
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Table 6. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of the TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1=sε , Without Disease Transmission) 
Welfare Impact of TBTT Removal 
Welfare Impact of TBTT +Tariff 
Removal 
 
 
 
 
 
α  
 
 
 
 
 
σ  
Tariff 
Revenue 
Change 
(1) 
 
 
EV 
(2) 
Producer
Surplus 
Loss 
(3) 
 
 
Net Welfare
(1)+(2)-(3)
 
 
EV 
(4) 
Producers 
Surplus 
Loss 
(5) 
 
 
Net Welfare
(4)-(5) 
2.94 4640 62839 22593 44886 73958 25276 48682 
7.12 1902 13239 9050 6091 20914 13554 7360 0.54 
11.3 810 4466 3603 1673 10532 8073 2459 
2.94 2014 22067 9705 14376 26636 11385 15251 
7.12 154 767 597 324 1549 1156 393 0.64 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2.94 606 5444 2523 3527 7017 3334 3683 
7.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.74 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Note: Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). The shaded area indicates the 
central case. --- denotes TBTT not being defined. 
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Table 7. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1=sε , With Disease Transmission) 
Welfare Impact of TBTT Removal 
Welfare Impact of TBTT +Tariff 
Removal 
 
 
 
 
 
α  
 
 
 
 
 
σ  
Tariff 
Revenue 
Change 
(1) 
 
 
EV 
(2) 
Producer
Surplus 
Loss 
(3) 
 
 
Net Welfare
(1)+(2)-(3)
 
 
EV 
(4) 
Producers 
Surplus 
Loss 
(5) 
 
 
Net Welfare
(4)-(5) 
2.94 5226 49311 25323 29214 60850 28165 32685 
7.12 2865 1713 13676 -9098 11045 19245 -8200 0.54 
11.3 1739 -7637 8262 -14160 855 14614 -13759 
2.94 2382 6589 11305 -2334 11613 13336 -1723 
7.12 301 -16380 706 -16785 -14330 2415 -16745 0.64 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2.94 738 -11016 3258 -13536 -9420 4102 -13522 
7.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.74 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Note: Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). The shaded area indicates the 
central case. --- denotes TBTT not being defined. 
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Table 8. Short-Run Welfare Analysis with Elimination of TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1.0=sε , Without Disease Transmission) 
Welfare Impact of TBTT Removal 
Welfare Impact of TBTT +Tariff 
Removal 
 
 
 
 
 
α  
 
 
 
 
 
σ  
Tariff 
Revenue 
Change 
(1) 
 
 
EV 
(2) 
Producer 
Surplus 
Loss 
(3) 
 
Net 
Welfare 
(1)+(2)-(3)
 
 
EV 
(4) 
Producers 
Surplus 
Loss 
(5) 
 
Net 
Welfare 
(4)-(5) 
2.94 4092 78060 35670 46482 91231 39840 51391 
7.12 1623 17904 13638 5889 27052 19660 7392 0.54 
11.3 725 6289 5387 1627 14130 11717 2413 
2.94 1871 29296 16379 14788 34942 10484 24458 
7.12 152 1183 968 367 2523 1273 1250 0.64 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2.94 592 7571 4560 3603 9739 5939 3800 
7.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.74 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Note: Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). The shaded area indicates the 
central case. --- denotes TBTT not being defined.  
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Figure 1. Sensitivity of net welfare (EV+tariff revenue-loss of producers’ surplus) to 
σ  and α  with elimination of TBT(without disease transmission) ( sε =1) 
Note: For visual simplicity, the net welfare measure where TBTT is not defined is set to 
be zero.  
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Figure 2. Increase in imports’ sensitivity to σ  and α  with elimination of the TBT 
(103 MT) 
Note: For visual simplicity, the net welfare measure where TBTT is not defined is set to 
be zero.  
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Appendix 
 
Estimation of Parameters σ and α   
 
Specification 
The derivation of the elasticity of substitution σ  and home-good preference parameterα  
is as follows. First, equation system (4) is used to obtain ratio D/I, which is then solved 
for Ip :  
(A.1) ( ) 1 (1 )/I Dp D I pσ αα
−= . 
We do not observe Ip  directly as it is a function of TBTT. We substitute Ip  into 
equation (2) and rearrange terms to obtain: 
(A.2) ( ) 11 11 /
D
M I D
p D
σ αα
− −⎛ ⎞− = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
where M is the expenditure on all apples evaluated at wholesale price. The left-hand term 
is just the ratio of expenditure shares.  
After taking natural logarithms, (A.2) becomes 
(A.3) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − α
α
σ
1lnln111ln
D
I
Dp
M
D
. 
Estimation Method  
We run two-stage least-square regression (2SLS) on (A.3) since the right hand side 
variable ( )ln /I D  is endogenously determined.1  In the first stage, we regress ( )ln /I D  
on all available exogenous variables instruments and get the least-square estimator of the 
coefficients of the instruments and the estimated value of ( )ln /I D , ( )nln /I D ; in the 
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second stage, we regress the left hand side of (A.3) on ( )ln /I D  and use the regression 
coefficient of ( )nln /I D  and intercept to recoverσ  andα (Greene 2002).  
Data 
We use the 2000-2004 monthly data for M, D, I and Dp  from Monthly Statistics of 
Japan; Japan Customs; and MAFF. I is the aggregate imports since the individual imports 
from each country are too small to derive the parameters. We have 42 data points because 
for some of the months, apple imports are zero. Expenditure M is computed as the sum of 
expenditure on both domestic imported apples. Expenditure on domestic apples is DpD . 
Expenditure on imported apples is Ip I . pI is approximated by 
2I CIFp p TR Tariff TBT≈ + + + , where 2TBT , an approximation of 2TBT  , is assumed 
small (5% of the CIF price). The approximation of 2TBT  has little influence on the 
estimation of the parameters since the expenditure on imported apples is less than 0.35% 
of the total expenditure on average. I* 2TBT  represents a very small percentage of the 
expenditure on all apples. We have varied 2TBT  from zero to 10% of the CIF price, and 
the estimation results remain very close to the 5% case (see results section below). The 
exogenous variables are the price CIFp , the Japanese real wage index, RWI , and year 
dummy variables in the first stage. The source for pCIF and RWI is Monthly Statistics 
of Japan. 
Results 
We develop the instrument for ( )ln /I D  using exogenous price CIFp  and the Japanese 
real wage index, RWI , and year dummy variables in the first stage. We regress 
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( )ln /I D on year dummy variables year1 (which is 2000), year2, year3, year4, 
CIFp ,
2
CIFp , RWI , and 
2RWI . The results of the first-stage estimation are shown in 
table A.1. 
The 2R  of the regression is 0.93 and adjusted 2R  is 0.92, indicating good fit. We 
developed alternative instruments using other exogenous variables such as monthly 
dummy variables, higher orders of CIF price and RWI. Results are very robust to 
variation in instruments. From the regression results above, we get the fitted value of 
( )ln /I D , ( )nln /I D . In the second stage, we regress the left-hand side of (A.3) on 
( )nln /I D . The results are shown in table A.2. 
The 2R  and adjusted 2R  of the regression are both 0.90. Combining the results in table 
A.2 and equation (A.3) allows us to obtain σˆ  andαˆ , results reported in table A.3. The 
estimates’ standard deviations are calculated using the Delta method (Greene 2002).  
We also used nonlinear least square on the second stage of the estimation, the results 
were nσˆ =7.15 and nαˆ =0.67, quite close to those obtained using 2SLS. Further, since we 
do not have an exact estimate of 2TBT , there may be some measurement error in the 
estimating results of σ  and α . The larger the approximation of 2TBT , the larger of the 
estimation results of the two parameters, but the difference is quite small. For instance, 
when 2TBT  is set to be 10% of the CIF price, nσˆ =7.14 and nαˆ =0.65. 
Footnotes 
1. The Hausman Test was conducted, and the P-value for the test was found to be <0.01, 
so ( )ln /I D  is endogenous. The estimation procedure used addresses the endogeneity. 
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Table A.1. First-Stage Estimation Results of the 2SLS 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Standard Deviation 
Constant 16.649* 2.281 
year1 -2.474* 0.304 
year2 -5.306* 0.613 
year3 -2.457* 0.325 
year4 -2.674* 0.333 
CIFp  -0.091* 0.020 
2
CIFp  0.00026* 0.00004 
RWI  -0.01890* 0.00442 
2RWI  0.00004* 0.00001 
 
Note: * the coefficient is significant at 1%. 
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Table A.2. Second-Stage Estimation Results of the 2SLS 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Standard Deviation 
Intercept -0.579* 0.220 
^
ln ( / )I D    0.860* 0.041 
 
Note: *the coefficient is significant at 1%. 
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Table A.3. Estimated Results of σ and α  
 
Parameter 
 
Estimated Value 
Approximate Standard 
Deviation 
σ  7.12* 2.09 
α  0.64* 0.05 
 
Note: *the coefficient is significant at 1%. 
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CHAPTER 3.    HOW TO PROMOTE QUALITY PERCEPTION IN WINE 
MARKET: BRAND ADVERTISING OR GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In the context of the wine industry, we investigate producers’ choice between 
geographical indications and brand advertising to convey information to consumers. 
Producers also decide whether or not to select an effort level for improving the quality of 
their products. We show that if this effort level is selected, a producer will prefer to rely 
on brand advertising for promoting its products and setting up its own reputation. Despite 
allowing the cost of promotion to be shared, a geographical indication does not 
sufficiently reward the effort to improve quality. Finally, the selection of both 
instruments by producers is examined. 
 
Key words: brand advertising, effort, geographical indication, GI, quality, wine. 
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Introduction 
Wine promotion has been modified recently with the emergence of “new-world” wine 
from Australia, California, and Chile. Wineries from these countries mainly use 
individual brand advertising (BA) to promote quality perception, while more traditional 
European wineries mainly rely on geographical indications (GIs) for signaling the quality 
of their products. Foreign consumers in Europe are often baffled by the profusion of wine 
GIs. Reliance on GIs to promote food and beverage products is widespread in Europe not 
only for wine but also for cheese, meat, and other products. For instance, nearly 700 
products are registered with the European designations system under the so-called 
Protected Designation of Origin and Protected Geographical Indication (EC, 2006). 
These differences raise the issue of the efficiency of the GI system for promoting food 
products relative to the merits of BA. 
We analyze the complex interaction between BA and GI and the rewards to 
quality improvements. We identify the relative effectiveness of BA and GI to reward 
producers1 for improvements in quality of their products, using a stylized framework 
linking product promotion and quality efforts. In a two-period model, BA and GI enhance 
the quality perception and the willingness to pay of consumers. The BA allows a 
producer to develop an individual reputation. The GI allows producers to share the cost 
of promotion and to develop a common reputation. Besides the choice of BA or GI, 
producers choose whether or not to make an effort to improve the overall quality level 
that affects the consumers’ purchase decision in the second period. Both signal and effort 
strategies influence the producers’ profits.  
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Wine production is notoriously stochastic, with “good” and “bad” years, and taste 
attributes vary. New technologies allow control of the consistency of taste attributes (e.g., 
controlled fermentation, varietal mix, and use of wood chips). These improvements are 
examples of what we mean by efforts to improve quality, i.e., investments in costly 
processes to improve the expected hedonic quality of a wine. We show that if the effort 
for improving quality is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on BA for promoting its 
products and setting up its own reputation. Despite the sharing of the cost of promotion, a 
GI does not sufficiently reward the effort for improving quality because of the common 
reputation. Conversely, when the producer avoids the effort, the GI is selected. Producers 
take advantage of sharing of the cost of promotion under collective reputation. 
This article is linked to two separate strands of the literature. The first strand 
includes numerous papers on quality signaling. The latter mainly considers prices (e.g., 
Mahenc, 2004) or advertising (e.g., Fluet and Garella, 2002) to signal higher quality. The 
second and more recent strand focuses on GI and collective reputation (e.g., Marette and 
Crespi, 2003; Zago and Pick, 2004; and Winfree and McCluskey, 2005). In this literature, 
producers’ coordination or even price collusion through a GI may be necessary to 
improve quality when the fixed costs of certification or quality improvements are large. 
Our framework differs because we simplify the consumers’ belief in higher quality by 
considering BA and GI as persuasive tools that change consumers’ preferences. In 
addition, our framework contributes to the more recent strand of literature. Here, we 
abstract from any price collusion linked to a GI and introduce the possibility that 
producers chose to use BA. Indeed, our article addresses the question of the relative 
efficiency of collective signals compared to that of a private brand and the possible 
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combination of both instruments, an issue that was previously overlooked in the 
literature. 
The next section expands on our contention that the emergence of “new-world” 
wine has relied on BA in contrast to the reliance of European wine on GIs. Then, in the 
third section, we introduce the model. The main results are presented in the fourth 
section, while the fifth provides some extensions, and the final section offers conclusions. 
An appendix provides detailed derivations of results presented in the text. 
 
Promotion Strategies in the Wine Market  
In the last 15 years, globalization and trade liberalization have entailed a new context of 
competition. While world consumption of wine has been increasing (WHO, 2006), wine 
exports of European countries such as France and Italy have leveled off. Conversely, the 
exports of Australia, Chile, Argentina, and the United States have steadily gained ground, 
as shown in figure 1, and markedly so in recent years.2 The European domination is being 
challenged by new producers from Chile and Australia. This new competition has 
modified strategies for signaling and promotion in the wine market (BA versus GI), 
accompanied by differences in cost structure, industry structure, and wine technology. 
The intellectual challenge is to elucidate the individual effect of these various elements. 
We focus on the noticeable efforts of these emerging competitors to improve quality 
through consistency and predictability of taste and the crucial role of their marketing 
strategies. The following stylized facts allow us to understand the differences between 
producers in Europe and in the emergent countries.3 
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First, several types of information such as the winery, the grape, or the origin are 
usually mentioned on most bottles. However, for a buyer, the most visible information in 
France is the GI for medium-quality wines, and the cumulative GI (appellation, grand 
cru, etc.) combined with the winery (“chateau”) for high-quality wines. Conversely, the 
brand is the most visible information for the Australian wines (e.g., Jacob’s Creek, 2005). 
Wine promotion in Australia, Chile, and the United States favors private BA, which 
facilitates individual reputation and recognition by buyers.  
Second, the profusion and proliferation of GIs in Europe lead to some risks of 
confusion for consumers (Marette and Zago, 2003). Peri and Gaeta (1999) count more 
than 400 official appellations in the wine sector in Italy, 450 appellations in France, and 
1,397 in the wine sector in Europe. Such profusion assures product diversity but certainly 
increases buyer confusion (Consumer Reports, 1997). The recognition of quality labels 
by French consumers is only 12% for Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée, the French GI 
system for high-quality products (Loisel and Couvreur, 2001). Berthomeau (2002) 
discusses the difficulty that some French GIs have in entering new export markets 
because of the absence of any clear specification of the label that distinguishes one 
appellation from another in consumers’ minds.4 In sharp contrast, Jacob’s Creek and 
Kendall Jackson wines can be found in most U.S. grocery stores.  
Third, many European GIs impose numerous restrictions that often stifle the 
search for commercial efficiency and innovations in quality that would improve the 
predictability in taste and consistency over time. Grape production is regulated, with a 
maximum yield allowed per unit of land. Excessive regulation for linking origin and 
quality seems problematic when the international competition is intense (Zago and Pick, 
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2004; and Ribaut, 2005). Conversely, the main features of regulations in the United 
States, Chile, and Australia are the lack of detailed rules and the freedom to experiment 
with new techniques; the production and marketing of wines according to single varieties 
of grapes, sometimes associated with a relatively large production region; and an intense 
use of marketing investments. 5  
Fourth, wineries in Australia are much bigger than the ones in Europe, and the 
industry in the “new world” has been dominated by relatively large producers. The 
average vineyard size in France is less than 2 hectares compared with 111 hectares in 
Australia. Four producers dominate the Australian market, namely, Foster, Southcorp, 
Hardy, and Orlando Wyndham. The combined production share of the four largest 
producers in New Zealand is 85%, while the combined production share of the two 
largest producers in South Africa is 80%. Unlike the industry in Australia, Chile, or other 
new world competing countries, the wine industry in Europe is fragmented. Indeed, apart 
from some notable exceptions, e.g., Champagne (The Economist, 2003), the wine 
industry in Europe is made up of many small producers that often lack adequate capital 
for the necessary investments in new technologies and marketing policies. In other words, 
small wineries are unable to reach the minimum-efficient scale since the quality 
improvement implies relatively large fixed costs. 
Beyond these empirical facts, further effects of the origin and the role of the GI 
are less easily evaluated. Despite the limits previously mentioned, GI also indicates 
natural conditions such as the soils and the climate specific to a certain geographic area 
(Barham, 2003). Origins of product matters for consumers’ purchase decisions. Orth et al. 
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(2005) show that the origin of a bottle does affect the U.S. consumers’ preference, as 
shown in table 1. 6  
However, GIs can be an efficient tool for signaling collective reputation. The 
Champagne GI is an example of successful collective reputation in which the 
combination of famous brands (with large vineyard size and enough capital for 
advertising) and a prestigious GI matters for consumers ready to pay a large premium 
(Combris et al., 2003). Orth and Krska (2002) show that consumers rank country and 
region of origin at the top of wine attributes, while the producer name is lower. An 
“efficient” combination of brands and GI also characterizes the Napa Valley appellation, 
which generates a significant price premium compared to an equivalent-quality bottle 
with a different appellation (Bombrun and Sumner, 2003). The efficiency of GI compared 
to that of a private brand is an open question. Some empirical studies of wine have 
elucidated consumers’ attitudes towards GIs and brands. With a parametric hedonic 
approach, Steiner (2004) shows that the decline of French wine in the British market is 
partly due to the consumers’ low valuation of geographical appellation. Riley et al. 
(1999) show a positive correlation between consumers’ attitudes (and perceptions) and 
relative brand size in the British wine market.  
The debate about the strategies of producers and the appropriate regulation will 
likely gain momentum. This last point leads directly to the focus of our article. Although 
the choice among tools for improving quality raises many questions, we focus on the 
central link between an effort for improving quality and different tools for quality 
signaling (BA versus GI and a combination of both). A stylized model is used to isolate 
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the impact of alternative ways to signal quality with and without efforts to improve 
quality.  
 
The Model 
We assume purchases occur in two periods (t=1, 2) with two producers i and j who may 
offer products of high quality or low quality. In the first period, producers i and j choose 
whether or not to promote their products and/or whether or not to improve the quality of 
their products. The cost of promotion is A. If the producers choose the GI, each producer 
incurs the cost A/2 since they share the cost. If a producer individually chooses to use 
BA, it incurs the cost A. The cost of product improvement is F. It is assumed that other 
costs of production are zero. For simplicity, it is also assumed that FA γ= , with 1≤γ . 
Each consumer only purchases one unit of the good per period t (Mussa and 
Rosen, 1978). A consumer who buys one unit of the product from producer i at price tip  
has an expected indirect utility equal to ti
t
i pqE −)(θ , where ( )tiE q  is the expected 
quality. The mass of those consumers is normalized at 1, with a uniformly distributed 
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity, we assume that consumers only want to get high 
quality (denoted Hq ) and they get no satisfaction from getting low quality ( 0q =A ). 
Consumers have limited knowledge about quality. In the first period (t=1), the 
consumer has a belief about the probability of getting high quality from producer i equal 
to αλ αiI+ , with 10 ≤+≤ αλ αiI . Parameter λ  is the initial belief about wine quality 
in the absence of promotion, and αiI  is an indicator linked to the promotion strategy. 
α
iI =1 means that producer i invests in promotion (BA or GI) for enhancing the 
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consumer’s perception of quality in the first period, while αiI =0 means producer i avoids 
investing in promotion. Parameter α is the incremental probability of purchasing wine of 
high quality. 
In the second period (t=2), consumers repeat their purchases by learning the 
average quality of the products because of an imperfect experience. Consumers can 
communicate with each other after the first period, so that common knowledge is formed 
regarding the average quality of the products among consumers. Consumers experience 
the product even if they know there is residual uncertainty that limits their knowledge. 
They learn about the probability of getting high-quality products by using complementary 
information (communication among the consumers, newspapers, and so forth). The 
probability of getting high-quality products depends on the producer’s decision for 
improving quality at cost F. The cost F implies an improvement of the probability of 
having high-quality products equal to e. Under BA, consumers are able to identify each 
producer’s improvement since promotion is individual. If producer i chose BA, the 
probability of having high-quality products is eI ei+λ  (with 0 1eiI eλ< + ≤ ), where λ  is 
the real probability of getting high-quality products in the absence of an effort. eiI  is an 
indicator of the probability improvement ( eiI =1 when F is incurred and zero otherwise). 
If both producers chose GI, consumers are not able to distinguish precisely the quality of 
both producers since the promotion is collective. Because GI leads to a collective 
reputation, the probability for consumers to get high-quality products in the absence of 
distinction between both producers is ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2e e e ei j i jI e I e I I eλ λ λ+ + + = + + , with 
ji ≠ . 
 
 
 
 
66
We summarize all the cases faced by producers and consumers in table 2. Recall 
that the low quality is Lq =0, so that the expected quality for consumers is equal to their 
belief regarding the probability of getting high quality multiplied by the quality level, 
Hq . 
The game proceeds in three stages in the first period. At the first stage, the 
producers make their decisions for promoting their products, namely GI, BA, or no 
signal. In the second stage, each producer decides whether or not to make an effort to 
improve the probability of producing high-quality goods. In the third stage of the first 
period, each producer selects a quantity (Cournot competition), and consumers decide on 
their consumption levels. They learn partial information through consumption. Stage 4 
corresponds to the second period, whereby the consumers repeat their purchase and each 
producer selects a quantity (Cournot competition). The timeline of the stages is shown in 
figure 2. We now turn to the presentation of the producers’ choices. 
The Producers’ Choices 
When producers choose the information strategy (in stage 1) and the effort strategies (in 
stage 2) that maximize their profits, they take into account the quantity choices in stages 
3 and 4. The sub-game perfect equilibrium is detailed in Appendix 1 and 2.  
The incentive for a producer to select promotion and/or an effort balances two 
opposing effects. An information/effort strategy leads to higher demand for its products 
by increasing the consumer’s willingness to pay. However, this positive effect may be 
offset by the fixed cost induced by these strategies or by the strategic interaction with the 
other producer. The producers’ choices depend on the efficiency of both promotion 
(represented by parameters αλ , , and γ ) and effort (represented by the parameter e). 
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The selection of the profit-maximizing strategies leads to a set of results 
(Propositions 1-4). The derivations are shown in the appendix. For sake of simplicity, we 
characterize the equilibrium strategies for alternative values of γ , namely, the relative 
cost of promotion compared to the cost of quality improvement (recall that A= Fγ ). 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the market equilibrium detailed in the propositions. The X-axis 
represents the quality level, Hq , and the Y-axis represents the fixed cost, F. The relative 
values of Hq  and F determine the producers’ optimal strategy and define the limits of 
different areas (the frontiers of these regions are detailed in the appendix). Below, we 
present the propositions and provide an intuitive interpretation. Let 
(1) 
)215636()34(
)215636()34(
222
222
1 λλλα
λλααλαγ +++
+++=
eee
e . 
 PROPOSITION 1. When the relative cost of signaling is low with 1γγ ≤ , the 
producers’ strategies are as follows (see figure 3):  
(a) both producers choose no signal and no producer makes an effort in area 1, 
(b) one producer chooses BA and no producer makes an effort in area 2, 
(c) one producer chooses BA and makes an effort in area 3, 
(d) one producer chooses BA and both producers make an effort in area 4.  
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
In area 1, making the effort or using a signal is too costly, since the respective 
costs represented by F (and Fγ ) are relatively large. When F decreases in areas 2, 3 and 
4, the different strategies of an effort and signal become affordable for the producer(s). 
When the cost of signaling is low with 1γγ ≤ , each producer will try to use the BA alone, 
since it increases the perception differentiation and the profit by means of the parameter 
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α  in the first period and the individual reputation in the second period. This market 
mechanism leads one producer to choose BA instead of cooperating with the other 
producer to select GI since the cost of signaling is relatively small. 
In area 2, one producer chooses BA because of the low cost of signaling 
(smallγ ), and no producer makes an effort because of the relatively high cost of the 
effort compared with the signal cost. When the relative value of F decreases further (area 
3), the producer choosing the BA chooses to make an effort. In area 3, the fixed cost is 
still quite high for the other producer to select a signal or an effort. When F is relatively 
small (area 4), both producers make an effort. Only one producer chooses the BA that 
allows a perceived increased quality differentiation in period 1.  
As α, the incremental probability of purchasing wine of high quality coming from 
promotion, is assumed to be the same under BA and GI, the market equilibrium with the 
two producers selecting BA never emerges. Indeed, it is optimal for both sellers to join 
the GI and to share the cost of promotion. 
We now turn to a situation in which the cost of promotion increases. Let 
(2) 
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 PROPOSITION 2. For a medium relative cost of signaling with 21 γγγ ≤< , area 2 
in figure 3 disappears. 
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
Since signaling is more costly, no producer selects the BA without making an 
effort. In other words, the BA is valuable only if an effort is made. Indeed compared to 
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Proposition 1, area 2 disappeared when γ  increased. We now turn to a situation in which 
the cost of promotion keeps increasing with 2 3γ γ γ< < 7. Let 
(3) 3
4
e
αγ =   
(4) 
4
3
1
λα =  
 PROPOSITION 3. When the relative cost of signaling is of medium level with 
32 γγγ ≤< , the producers’ strategies are as follows (see figure 4):  
(a) both producers choose no signal and no producer makes an effort in area 1’, 
(b) both producers choose GI but no producer makes an effort in area 5, 
(c) both producers make an effort; one producer chooses BA if 1αα >  and both of them 
choose GI if 1αα <  in area 6. 
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
When the cost of promotion continues to increase, the GI becomes more attractive 
compared to the BA because the producers share the cost of promotion. Areas 3 and 4 
from figure 3 disappear, since the cost of BA becomes too high for a single producer to 
afford. In figure 4, the producers lean toward [choose] GI rather than doing BA 
individually. Some new equilibria appear in figure 4.  
In reference to area 4 of former figure 3, here, in figure 4, GI replaces BA for 
large values of F. The story in area 6 is the following: if signaling is not persuasive up to 
a certain level ( 1αα < ), producers would choose to cooperate with each other and do GI 
to share the fixed cost. However, if signaling is effective and α  is greater than some 
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certain level 1α , one producer would do BA to distinguish itself from the other in the first 
period to gain higher profit.  
 PROPOSITION 4. When the relative cost of signaling is high ( },max{ 32 γγγ > ) the 
producers’ strategies are as follows (see figure 4):  
(a) no producer chooses any signal strategy and no producer makes an effort in area 1’,  
(b) both producers make no signal but both producers make an effort in area 7, and  
(c) both producers make an effort; one producer chooses BA if 1αα >  and both of them 
choose GI if 1αα <  in area 6’. 
The proof is given in Appendix 1. 
Proposition 4 is illustrated in figure 5. In this case, the cost of signaling is so large 
that even the effect of cost-sharing of GI does not work well. Therefore, area 5 in figure 4 
disappears. As the cost of making an effort continues to decrease, producers choose to 
make an effort instead of signaling in area 7. In reality, this corresponds to a new 
technology, which decreases the fixed cost of investing in quality improvements. 
From the foregoing four propositions, we can conclude that the strategies of the 
producers depend on the relative effectiveness of providing quality improvements and 
signaling. When signaling is more effective and the fixed cost of providing a quality 
effort is large, producers tend not to make an effort; when quality improvement is more 
effective and the fixed cost of signaling is large, producers tend not to signal. We also 
conclude that BA provides producers with a higher incentive to make an effort than GI 
does, since GI is a collective reputation. If the effort for improving quality is selected, a 
producer will prefer to rely on BA for promoting its wine and set up its own reputation. 
Despite the sharing of the cost of promotion, a GI does not sufficiently reward the effort 
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for improving quality because of the common reputation. On the contrary, when the 
producer avoids making an effort, GI is selected to be the promotion strategy. In this 
case, producers take advantage of sharing of the cost of promotion and collective 
reputation.  
 
Extensions 
In defining the analytical framework, restrictive assumptions were made for simplicity. 
Some of the results of the model are robust if we consider the following extensions.  
(i) In our model we abstract from the combination of GI and BA. One extension 
could be the incorporation of this combination. The following assumption could be made: 
In the first period, GI enhances the consumer’s expectation by α  and costs producers 
2
A ; 
BA enhances the consumer’s expectation by α  as well but costs producers A ; and the 
combination of the two enhances the consumer’s expectation by αc  and costs producers 
2
3A . When the combination of these two are effective (high αc  compared with the cost 
2
3A ), the producers would choose the combination; if the combination were not effective 
enough, producers would choose GI or BA individually, which goes back to the 
propositions of this article. Let  
}
)92416(3
1414192432,1min{ 2234
332234
1 λαλαα
λαλαλαλαα
++
−−−+=c  and when 1cc < , the 
combination of BA and GI is dominated by BA or GI in equilibrium and it never 
emerges. (See the proof in Appendix 2 [point viii]).  
(ii) In our model, signaling has an effect only in the first period. One extension 
 
 
 
 
72
could be the introduction of an effect of signaling on consumers’ expectation in the 
second period. That is, the second period’s expectation of consumers is the combination 
of the expectation of the first period and the real probability. For example, when 
producers choose GI, consumers’ expectation in the second period is 
[ ))(1())(5.0( αλϕλϕ +−+++ eII ejei ] Hq , where 10 ≤≤ϕ . The higher the effectiveness 
of signals in the second period, the closer is consumers’ expectation to the real 
probability. By doing this, we introduce an interaction effect of signaling and making an 
effort. We expect that producers’ incentive to make an effort is lower when the second-
period effectiveness of signaling is lower.  
(iii) Our model abstracts from the discount of the second-period profit of the 
consumers. If there is a discount in the second period, the larger the discount, the lower is 
the producers’ incentive to make an effort.  
(iv) In the model, we abstracted from a context with numerous producers. Since GI 
has the property of cost-sharing, one natural question is, if there are numerous producers, 
will the producers prefer GI to BA since they could share the promotion cost by doing GI? 
To answer this question, we abstract from the strategy of making an effort in this 
extension. Suppose there are n producers. They could choose to do GI together to share 
the signal cost in the first period. When the signal cost is not quite high, the producers 
have the incentive to deviate to do BA by themselves. Suppose initially all producers do 
GI and the first producer chooses to deviate from GI to BA only if 
1
)1(
1
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)()( 22
2
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−++
++
<
n
nnn
nn
A
λα
λααλ
. The results indicate that even though by 
doing GI a larger number of producers lower the cost of promotion for each producer, the 
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producers still have an incentive to deviate to do BA if the promotion cost is not quite 
high. By doing GI, the producers share not only the cost but also the profit. 
(v) We considered only one region. One extension of our model is the introduction 
of several regions. Probabilities of producing high-quality goods are different across 
different regions. We expect that producers in a region with high probability have more 
incentive to do GI.  
(vi) We assumed vertical differentiation. An alternative solution is to introduce 
horizontal differentiation. In this context with m consumers and perfect information, m1 
consumers prefer goods from producer 1 and (m-m1) consumers prefer goods from 
producer 2. Using our model we expect that as m1 increases, producer 1’s incentive to 
signal and make an effort increases. 
(vii) We assumed the BA and GI have the same α, which is the incremental 
probability of purchasing wine of high quality from consumers’ subjective point of view. 
That is, BA enhances consumers’ perception in the first period in the same way as GI. 
This leads to the conclusion that the case in which both producers choose BA as their 
promotion strategy and both make an effort (or both producers make no effort) is 
dominated in equilibrium by the strategies that both producers choose GI and both 
producers make an effort (or both producers make no effort). (See the proof of point (iii) 
in Appendix 2.) One extension of our model is to assume that BA and GI have different 
effects on consumers’ perception in the first period. Suppose we assume the incremental 
probability of purchasing wine of high quality in the first period for BA is BAα , whereas 
for GI the value is GIα . When 
2
9AGIBA >−αα (>
n
An 2)1( +  when there are n producers), 
the strategy that both producers choose BA emerges. That is, producers do BA instead of 
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GI if BA is somewhat more effective in enhancing consumers’ perception in the first 
period than GI.  
Conclusions  
In the context of the international wine market, we explored producers’ choice between 
promotional strategies (BA and GI) and quality improvement strategies and how these 
strategic choices affect consumers’ wine purchasing decisions. Although admittedly 
stylistic, our model nonetheless highlights the complicated strategies for monitoring 
uncertain quality.  
We show that the producers’ choice depends on the relative efficiency of 
promotional strategies compared with that of making an effort to improve quality. 
Another important result is that if the effort for improving quality is selected, a producer 
would like to use BA for promoting its wine and set up its own reputation. In spite of its 
advantage in allowing producers to share the cost of promotion, a GI does not sufficiently 
reward the effort for improving quality since it promotes a collective reputation. 
However, when the producer chooses not to make an effort to improve the quality, a GI is 
selected to be the promotion strategy. In the latter case, by using a GI, producers can take 
advantage of the sharing of the cost of promotion and collective reputation. We further 
explored extensions of our analysis showing it is quite promising for further 
generalizations.   
These results can be applied to draw some implications about the diverging 
fortunes of “new-world” and European wines. Emergence of wines from the new world 
leads to new contexts of competition that require the modification of signaling strategies. 
There are more incentives for producers to differentiate themselves by improving quality 
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and revealing more information. Our article, however, shows that GI is not necessarily 
compatible with quality improvement. This means that producers inside a GI should 
revamp their strategies for promotion, as, for instance, with the development of generic 
advertising for the world market based on a well-identified appellation. This may also 
result in the concentration of wine brands and advertising. Of course, the diverging 
fortunes of new-world and European wines hinge on additional factors, which we 
abstracted from to focus on promotion and quality improvement strategies. Beyond these 
two aspects, access to capital, regulations, cost structure, and size—all play an important 
role in the evolution of the international wine market.  
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Table 1. Consumers’ Preference for Wine Origin 
Origin Mean Rank Standard Deviation
California 3.03 1.95 
France 3.88 2.49 
Italy 4.38 2.18 
Australia 4.67 2.51 
Oregon 4.78 2.55 
Chile 5.75 2.32 
Spain 5.87 1.98 
Washington 6.02 2.42 
New Zealand 6.51 1.89 
Source: Table 1 in Orth, Wolf, and Dodd 2005. 
Note: Scale from 1 = most preferred to 9 = least preferred 
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Table 2. Producers’ strategy and consumers’ expectation of producers’ quality  
( Lq = 0) 
First Period Second Period 
Producer i’s 
Strategy 
(Producer j’s 
Strategy) 
Cost Incurred 
by Producer i 
and j 
Consumer’s 
Expected Quality of 
Producer i and j 
Consumer’s Expected 
Quality of Producer i and j
No signal 
(No signal)* 
e
iI F λ Hq  ))(5.0( eII
e
j
e
i ++λ Hq  
GI 
(GI)* 
e
iI F+0.5A ( αλ + ) Hq  ))(5.0( eII ejei ++λ Hq  
BA 
(BA)* 
e
iI F+A ( αλ + ) Hq  )( eI ei+λ Hq  
BA 
(No signal)** 
e
iI F+A 
( ejI F) 
( αλ + ) Hq  
(λ Hq ) 
)( eI ei+λ Hq  
( ( )ejI eλ + Hq ) 
*Identical values for i and j. **No signal/(BA) is obtained by switching the payoff rows of BA/(No signal). 
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Data Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database. 
Figure 1. Wine exports value (basis 100 in 1990) 
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Figure 2. Timeline of the game 
First Period 
Promotion 
Strategies  
Quality 
Improvement 
Cournot  
Competition 
First Purchase 
by Consumers  
Cournot 
 Competition 
Second Purchase  
by Consumers  
Second Period 
Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3 Stage 4  
 
 
 
 
83
 
0
1F
2
3
4
Hq
One producer chooses BA
Two producers make the effort
F1 F2
One producer chooses
BA and the effort
F3
No Signal
No Effort One producer chooses BA
No Effort
 
Figure 3. The strategies with low relative cost of signaling ( 1γγ ≤ ) 
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0
1’
F
5
Hq
Two producers make the effort
F4
GI  
No Effort
No Signal
No Effort F5 if  BA
F6 if  GI
BA by one producer if α>α1
GI  if  α < α1
6
 
Figure 4. The strategies with medium relative cost of signaling ( 32 γγγ ≤< )  
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0
1’
F
Hq
Two producers make the effort
F7
No Signal
No Effort
No Signal
Two producers
make the effort
F8 if  BA
F9 if  GI
7
6’
BA by one producer if  α >α1
GI  if  α < α1
 
Figure 5. The strategies with high relative cost of signaling ( { }2 3max ,γ γ γ> ) 
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Footnotes 
1 Producers denote the supply chain (producers, wineries, firms) supplying wine to 
consumers. 
2 Note that this figure exhibits aggregated volumes that neglect segmentation and quality 
heterogeneity. 
3 The stylized facts mainly concerned consumption wines that differ from collectible 
wines reserved to experts (Costanigro et al., 2005). 
4 The collective reputation of French wines plummeted during the last decade (Conan, 
2005; Echikson, 2005; and Ribaut, 2005). Giraud-Heraud et al. (2002) and Ribaut (2005) 
mentioned the need for winery consolidation and/or reform of the French GI system. 
5 In September 2005, the United States and the European Union reached a wine-trade 
agreement that makes some U.S. practices, such as adding wood chips to wine barrels, 
legitimate in the European Union. U.S. companies will stop using some GIs, such as 
Champagne, Sherry, and Port. Some EU lawmakers are not satisfied with this agreement 
because the European wine industry is strictly regulated and emphasizes traditional 
practices, while the U.S. industry emphasizes new technology that allows better control 
of taste characteristics and their identification by consumers (Locke, 2005). 
6 It should be noted that the origin in Table 1 corresponds to countries or U.S. states, as 
that would be the case for GIs in France or Italy, associations that often concern sub-
regions or small areas. 
7 The relative values of 2γ  and 3γ  depend on the relative values of e,,λλ , and α . If 
32 γγ > , Proposition 3 does not exist. 
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Appendix 1  
The consumer’s demand and producers’ profits are presented before detailing the proof of 
propositions, with the characterization of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this 
four-stage game (solved by backward induction). 
The consumer utility is ∑
=
−
2
1
)(
t
t
i
t
i pqEθ  by consuming the product by producer i 
(i=1 or 2). In period t (t=1 or 2), if the two producers choose the same strategy, 
then ttt qqEqE == )()( 21  and ttt ppp == 11 . When 0=− tt pqθ , the consumer is 
indifferent between buying and not buying a product in period t, implying that her taste 
parameter  is t
t
t
q
p=θ . As the distribution of preference is uniform, the demand for the 
product is t
t
t
q
px −=1  and ttt qxp )1( −= . In period t, if the two producers choose 
different strategies, then the expected quality of the products from two producers are 
different: tt qqE 11 )( = and tt qqE 22 )( = . Suppose tq1 > tq1  (indicating tp1 > tp2 ); the 
consumer’s demand for producer 1’s product is tt
tt
t
qq
pp
x
21
21
1 1 −
−−= . The demand for 
producer 2’s product is t
t
tt
tt
t
q
p
qq
pp
x
2
2
21
21
2 −−
−= . By solving the system of equations of 
tt
tt
t
qq
pp
x
21
21
1 1 −
−−=  and t
t
tt
tt
t
q
p
qq
pp
x
2
2
21
21
2 −−
−=  for tp1  and tp2 , we get 
ttttt xqxqp 22111 )1( −−=  and )1( 2122 tttt xxqp −−= .  
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In stage 2, each producer chooses a level of quantity, taking into account the 
quantity of the other producer. For the case in which the two producers’ strategies are 
different, the profit for the higher expected quality producer is  
∑ ∑
= =
′−−−−=′−−=
2
1
2
1
111221111111 ))1((
t t
etttttett AIFIxxqxqAIFIqp ααπ  
and the profit for the lower expected quality producer is  
∑ ∑
= =
′−−−−=′−−=
2
1
2
1
22221222222 )1(
t t
ettttett AIFIxxxqAIFIqp ααπ . 
A′  is the fixed cost associated with information strategies: AA =′  if BA is chosen and 
2
AA =′ if GI is chosen. The first-order conditions for the maximization of 1π  with 
respect to tx1  (namely, 0
1
1 =∂
∂
tx
π
) and 2π  with respect to tx2  (namely, 0
2
2 =∂
∂
tx
π
) lead 
to equilibrium prices ∗tx1  and 
∗tx2 . The substitution of these equilibrium quantities into 
1π  and 2π  leads to the following respective profits for producer 1 and producer 2:  
(A1.1) AIFI
qq
qqq e
t
tt
ttt
′−−−
−=∑
=
∗ απ 11
2
1
2
21
2
211
1 )4(
)2(
  
(A1.2) AIFI
qq
qq e
t
tt
tt
′−−−=∑=∗ απ 22
2
1
2
21
2
12
2 )4(
   
A particular case of (A1.1) and (A1.2) is when both producers choose the same strategies 
in both periods (which leads to ttt qqq == 21 ): 
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(A.2) AIFI
q
i
e
i
t
t
i ′−−=∑
=
∗ απ 2
1 9
 i=1 or 2  
The decision on the choice of strategies in stage 1 depends on these profits, which in turn 
depends on the expected quality and fixed costs listed in table 2 of the main text. In stage 
1, each producer faces the choices of strategies listed in the first column of table 2. The 
decision depends on the comparison among the profits. Table 2 lists all the cases of the 
expected qualities and associated costs by choosing different strategies for the two 
producers. If the expected qualities for the two producers are the same, substitute them in 
(A2) and get the profits for the two producers. If the expected qualities for the two 
producers are different, substitute them in (A1.1) and (A1.2) and get the profits for the 
two producers.  
We use 
i
IstrategyIstrategy ee )(2)(1 21 +π  to denote producer i’s profit, with producer 1 
choosing strategy 1 and producer 2 choosing strategy 2 and an effort-making decision 
( 1=eiI  means making an effort; 0=eiI  means avoiding making an effort). Among the 
strategies, no signal is denoted by n, GI is denoted by GI, and BA is denoted by BA. For 
example, 2 )1()1( nBA +π  denotes producer 2’s profit when producer 1 chooses BA and makes 
an effort and producer 2 chooses no signal but makes an effort.  
 
The Frontiers Determination and Proof of Propositions 
We now turn to the equilibrium strategies that lead to Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4.  
The Nash equilibrium is such that a producer will choose a strategy that leads to a 
higher profit than all other available strategies given the other producer’s strategy.  
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Proof of Proposition 1 
If no signal and no effort is a Nash equilibrium, the producers have no incentive 
to deviate to other strategies; that is, the corresponding profits should be largest. 
Therefore, the following conditions have to be satisfied:  
(A2.1) 1 1(0) (0) (1) (0)n n n nπ π+ +>  and 2 )1()0(2 )0()0( nnnn ++ > ππ   
(A2.2) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( nBAnn ++ > ππ  and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (0)n n n BAπ π+ +> ;  
(A2.3) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ  and 2 )0()0(2 )0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ . 
Applying point(i) in Appendix 2, (A2.1) leads to the inequality 
F> 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
(A2.2) leads to  
F>
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + ;  
and (A2.3) leads to  
3
2
9 H
F f qαγ> = . 
No matter what value γ  takes, the condition 
2 2
2 3 2
(4 8 3 ) 0
(4 3 ) H
f f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ +− = >+  is 
satisfied, which implies 2 3f f> . By comparing 1f  and 3f , we have when 3 4e
αγ γ< = , 
1f < 3f .  
If producer 1 choosing BA and no effort and producer 2 making no signal and no 
effort is Nash equilibrium, the following conditions have to be satisfied after applying 
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point (iii) in Appendix 2 (the strategy that both producers choose BA is dominated in 
equilibrium):  
(A3.1) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( nnnBA ++ > ππ    
(A3.2) 1 )0()1(
1
)0()0( nBAnBA ++ > ππ   
(A3.3) 1 1(0) (0) (0) (1)BA n BA nπ π+ +>  
(A3.4) 1 1(0) (0) (0) (0)BA n GI GIπ π+ +> . 
(A3.1) leads to 
F<
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + ; 
(A3.2) leads to  
F>
2 2
4 2
(36 56 21 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
42 ff >  implies )215636()34(
)215636()34(
222
222
1 λλλα
λλααλαγγ +++
+++=<
eee
e ; otherwise, we have 42 ff < .  
According to point(iv) in Appendix 2, the strategy that one producer chooses BA and 
makes no effort and the other producer makes no signal and makes an effort is dominated 
in equilibrium so (A3.3) is ignorable.  
(A3.4) leads to  
F<
2 2
5 2
8 (5 8 3 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + ; 
2 2
5 2 2
2 (4 8 3 ) 0
9 (4 3 ) H
f f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ +− = >+ , which implies 25 ff > .  
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Therefore, only when 
)215636()34(
)215636()34(
222
222
1 λλλα
λλααλαγγ +++
+++=<
eee
e  does the case emerge 
that one firm makes BA and no firm makes the effort to improve quality. By comparing 
1γ  and 3γ we have 1 3γ γ< for sure, which implies 2f > 3f > 1f  when 1γγ < . Therefore, 
when 1γγ < , we have  
1F =
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += +  
and  
2F =
2 2
4 2
(36 56 21 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + . 
 
So if 1γγ <  when F> 1F , the strategy emerges in equilibrium that both producers make no 
signal and no effort and when 2F <F< 1F , the strategy emerges in equilibrium that one 
producer chooses BA and makes no effort and the other producer makes no signal and no 
effort.  
If producer 1 choosing BA and making an effort and producer 2 making no 
signal and no effort is Nash equilibrium, the following conditions have to be satisfied 
(when the second producer does not deviate to make an effort to improve quality):  
(A4.1) 1 1(1) (0) (0) (0)BA n BA nπ π+ +>   
(A4.2) 2 2(1) (0) (1) (1)BA n BA nπ π+ +>   
(A4.3) 1 1(1) (0) (1) (0)BA n GI GIπ π+ +>   
(A4.4) 1 1(1) (0) (1) (0)BA n n nπ π+ +> . 
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(A4.1) leads to  
F< 2F =
2 2
4 2
(36 56 21 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
(A4.2) leads to  
F>
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
(A4.3) leads to  
F<
2 3 2 2
2
7 2 3 2 2
2
8 (112 45 16 (5 11 ) 6 (20 11 ))
9 (4 3 )
(8 3 )(168 72 8 (16 33 ) 3 (64 33 ))
9 (4 3 )
H
e e e
e
f q
e e e
e
α αλ α λ λ α λ
γ λ
αλ λ αλ α λ λ α λ
γ λ
⎛ ⎞+ + + + +⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ + + + + ++⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. 
According to point(vii) in Appendix 2, (A4.4) is ignorable. 
2 2
4 6 2
(20 25 6 ) 0
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef f q
e
λ λ
λ
+ +− = >+ , which implies 4 6f f> . And we also have 7 4f f> . 
One producer choosing BA and making effort and the other producer choosing no 
signal but making effort is a Nash equilibrium when the following conditions are 
satisfied:  
(A5.1) 2 2(1) (1) (1) (0)BA n BA nπ π+ +>  
(A5.2) 1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)BA n n nπ π+ +>  
(A5.3) 1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)BA n GI GIπ π+ +> . 
(A5.1) leads to  
F<
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + ; 
(A5.2) leads to  
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F<
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + . 
According to the point(v) in Appendix 2, GI is dominated by BA when 1γ γ< ; (A5.3) is 
ignorable. Since 42 ff >  and 4 6f f> , we have 2 6f f> . Therefore, we have the frontier 
3F =
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += + . 
Proof of Proposition 2 
When 1γ γ> , 2F > 1F , the strategy in which one producer chooses BA and makes no effort 
and the other producer makes no signal and no effort does not emerge in equilibrium, 
which leads to Proposition 2. The frontier 1F  becomes the border between area 1 and area 
3, so when 1γ γ> , 
2 3 2 2
2 2
1 2 3 2 2
2 2
4 (144 81 12 (18 7 ) 16 (9 14 ))
9(1 )(4 3 ) (4 3 )
(8 3 )(108 63 21 (8 3 ) 56 (2 3 ))
9(1 )(4 3 ) (4 3 )
H
e e e
e
F q
e e e
e
α αλ λ α λ α λ
γ λ α λ
αλ λ αλ λ α λ α λ
γ λ α λ
⎛ ⎞+ + + + +⎜ ⎟+ + +⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟+ + + + + ++⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
. 
We need to compare 3F  and this new 1F . Area 3 emerges only if 1F > 3F ; 
otherwise, area 3 disappears. 1F > 3F  only if 2γ γ< , where 
)153116()34(
))75112()328(66360)(38(
)153116()34(
))2536(4)9(248180(4
222
2232
222
2232
2
λλλα
λαλαλαλλλα
λλλα
λαλαλαλαγ
+++
+++++++
+++
+++++=
eee
eee
eee
eee
 
and 1 2γ γ< . 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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When 2γ γ> , area 2 and area 3 in figure 3 disappear. It’s possible that GI emerges in 
equilibrium (it was dominated when area 2 and area 3 emerge according to point(v) in 
Appendix 2). The strategy that both producers choose no signal and none of them makes 
an effort to improve quality emerges in equilibrium if the following conditions are 
satisfied:  
(A6.1) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ  and 2 )0()0(2 )0()0( GIGInn ++ > ππ ;  
(A6.2) 1 1(0) (0) (1) (0)n n n nπ π+ +>     and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (1)n n n nπ π+ +> .  
(A6.1) leads to  
F> 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A6.2) leads to  
F> 1 18 H
ef q= . 
When 2γ γ> , the strategy that both producers choose GI and none of them makes 
an effort to improve quality emerges in equilibrium if the following conditions are 
satisfied:  
(A7.1) 1 1(0) (0) (0) (0)GI GI n nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (0)GI GI n nπ π+ +> ;  
(A7.2) 1 1(0) (0) (1) (0)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +>  and 2 2(0) (0) (0) (1)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +> . 
(A7.1) leads to  
F< 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A7.2) leads to  
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F> 1 18 H
ef q= . 
GI would emerge only if 1 3f f< , which implies 3 4e
αγ γ< = . We cannot rank 2γ  and 
3γ . So if 2γ > 3γ , GI would not emerge, either. So when 2 3γ γ γ< < , 
4F = 3 29 Hf q
α
γ= . 
The strategy that both producers choose GI and both of them make an effort to 
improve quality emerges in equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:  
(A8.1) 1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI n nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI n nπ π+ +> ;  
(A8.2) 1 1(1) (1) (0) (1)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (0)GI GI GI GIπ π+ +> ; 
(A8.3) 1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI BA nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)GI GI n BAπ π+ +> .  
(A8.1) leads to  
F< 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A8.2) leads to  
F< 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
(A8.3) leads to 
α <
4
3
1
λα = . 
When 3γ γ< , we have 1 3f f< , so  
5F = 1 18 H
ef q= . 
 
 
 
 
97
When α > 1α , 6F is the border between area 5 and the strategy that both producers make 
an effort and one of them uses BA: 
6F =
2 2
2
8 (4 5 ) (16 6 )(3 4 )
9(2 )(4 3 )
e eα α αλ λ α
γ α λ
+ + + +
+ + . 
6F < 4F  only when 
2
4 2 2
2 (4 3 )
4 (4 ) (8 3 )(3 )e e
α α λγ γ α α αλ λ α
+> = + + + + , where 4 3γ γ< . 
Proof of Proposition 4 
When 2 3max{ , }γ γ γ> , we have 1 3f f>  so the strategy that both producers choose GI 
and make no effort does not emerge; that is, area 5 in figure 4 disappears. Both producers 
choose no signal and both of them make an effort to improve quality if the following 
conditions are satisfied:  
(A9.1) 1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)n n GI GIπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)n n GI GIπ π+ +> ;  
(A9.2) 1 1(1) (1) (0) (1)n n n nπ π+ +>  and     2 2(1) (1) (1) (0)n n n nπ π+ +> ;  
(A9.3) 1 1(1) (1) (1) (1)n n BA nπ π+ +>  and 2 2(1) (1) (1) (1)n n n BAπ π+ +> .  
(A9.1) leads to  
F> 3
2
9 H
f qαγ= ; 
(A9.2) leads to  
F< 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
(A9.3) leads to 
F>
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + . 
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So, in figure 5,  
7F = 1 18 H
ef q= ; 
8F = 3 29 Hf q
α
γ= ; 
9F =
2 2
2 2
(36 56 21 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + . 
9 7F F<  only when 
2 2
5 2
2 (36 56 21 )
(4 3 )e
α α αλ λγ γ α λ
+ +> = + , where 5γ > 3γ . 
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Appendix 2 
The following strategies are dominated: 
(i) Both producers choose no signal, and one of them chooses to make an effort. 
(ii) Both producers choose GI, and one of them chooses to make an effort. 
(iii) Both producers choose BA. 
(iv) The strategy in which one producer chooses BA and makes no effort and the 
other producer makes no signal and makes an effort is dominated in 
equilibrium.  
(v) The strategy in which both producers choose GI and make no effort is 
dominated by the strategy in which one producer chooses BA and makes no 
effort and the other producer chooses no signal and no effort if the latter 
strategy emerges (the emergence of the latter strategy depends on the values 
of the parameters).  
(vi) The strategy in which both producers choose GI and make an effort is 
dominated by the strategy in which one producer chooses BA and the other 
producer chooses no signal and both producers make an effort when 
α >
4
3
1
λα = . 
(vii) The strategies in which both producers choose GI and make an effort, or both 
producers choose no signal but make an effort are dominated by the strategy 
in which one of them could choose BA and make an effort and the other 
producer chooses no signal and makes no effort if the latter strategy emerges. 
(viii) One producer chooses the combination of GI and BA; another producer 
chooses GI alone; and both of the producers choose the combination of GI 
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and BA.  
Proof of Points (i) and (ii) 
The strategy in which both producers use no signal, producer 1 makes an effort, and 
producer 2 makes no effort is not dominated when the following conditions are satisfied. 
Producer 1 does not deviate to make no effort and producer 2 does not deviate to make an 
effort. That is, 
(B1.1) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()1( nnnn ++ > ππ  
(B1.2) 
2
)1()1(
2
)0()1( nnnn ++ > ππ .  
(B1.1) is satisfied by Hq
eF
18
<  and (B1.2) is satisfied by HqeF 18> ; these two 
cannot be satisfied at the same time, so the strategy is dominated in equilibrium. Similar 
proof applies to point (ii). 
Proof of Point (iii) 
FAqe H
i
BABA −−+++=+ 9
)()(
)1()1(
λαλπ , which is always less than 
FAqe H
i
GIGI −−+++=+ 29
)()(
)1()1(
λαλπ , i=1,2. So the producers would rather 
choose GI and make an effort to achieve the same profit with a lower cost. 
Proof of Point (iv) 
The case in which producer 1 chooses BA and makes no effort and producer 2 makes no 
signal but makes an effort is not dominated when the following necessary conditions are 
satisfied: producer 1 does not deviate to make an effort and producer 2 does not deviate 
to make no effort. That is, 
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(B2.1) 
1
)1()1(
1
)1()0( nBAnBA ++ > ππ ,  
(B2.2)  
2
)0()0(
2
)1()0( nBAnBA ++ > ππ .  
(B2.1) is satisfied by F>
2 2
6 2
(16 31 15 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef q
e
λ λ
λ
+ += +  and (B2.2) is satisfied by 
F<
2
8 4 3 H
e ef q
e
λ
λ
+= + , but 
2 2
6 8 2
4 (5 8 3 )
9(4 3 ) H
e e ef f q
e
λ λ
λ
+ +− = − + <0, so the necessary 
conditions cannot be satisfied.  
Proof of Point (v) 
The strategy in which producer 1 chooses GI and makes no effort is not dominated when 
the following necessary conditions are satisfied: producer 1 does not deviate to make no 
signal and make no effort, and producer 1 does not deviate to choose BA alone. That is, 
(B3.1) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( nnGIGI ++ > ππ ,  
(B3.2) 1 )0()0(
1
)0()0( nBAGIGI ++ > ππ .  
(B3.1) is satisfied by HqfF γ
α
9
2
3 =< , and (B3.2) is satisfied by 
F>
2 2
5 2
8 (5 8 3 )
9 (4 3 ) H
f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ += + , but 3f < 5f , which cannot satisfied.  
Proof of Point (vi) 
The case in which producer 1 chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 makes no 
signal but makes an effort is not dominated when the following necessary conditions are 
satisfied: producer 1 does not deviate to choose GI and make an effort and producer 2 
does not deviate to choose GI and make an effort. That is, 
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(B4.1)  1 )1()1(
1
)1()1( GIGInBA ++ > ππ   
 
(B4.2)  2 )1()1(
2
)1()1( GIGInBA ++ > ππ . 
(B4.1) is satisfied by 
2 2
5 2
8 (5 8 3 )
9 (4 3 ) H
F f qα α αλ λγ α λ
+ +< = +  and (B4.2) is satisfied by 
2
9 2
2 ( )
9 (3 4 ) H
F f qλ α λ λ αγ λ α
⎛ ⎞+ +> = −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ . When 4
f < 9f (which indicates α > 4
3
1
λα = ), 
the strategy in which producer 1 chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 makes 
no signal but makes an effort is not dominated, but the strategy in which both choose GI 
and make an effort is dominated. When 4f > 5f  (which indicates α < 4
3
1
λα = ), the 
strategy that producer 1 chooses BA and makes an effort and producer 2 makes no signal 
but makes an effort is dominated, but the strategy in which both choose GI and make an 
effort is not dominated. 
Proof of Point (vii) 
Both producers choose GI and make an effort when the following necessary conditions 
are satisfied: producers do not deviate to make no effort and one of the producers does 
not deviate to choose BA and make an effort conditional on the other producer choose no 
signal and make no effort. That is: 
(B5.1) 
1
)0()1(
1
)1()1( nBAGIGI ++ > ππ  
(B5.2)  
1
)1()0(
1
)1()1( GIGIGIGI ++ > ππ .  
(B5.1) is satisfied by 
2 2
10 2 2
2 ( )( 2 ) ( )( 2 )
(3 4 ) 9 (3 4 ) 9 H
e e eF f q
e
λ α λ α λ α λ λ λ
γ λ α λ
⎛ ⎞+ + + + + +> = − + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  and (A7.2) is 
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satisfied by 1 18 H
eF f q< = . But 
3 2 2
10 1 2
16 (5 ) 45 8 (10 (16 3 ) ) 3 (40 (16 3 ) )
18(3 4 ) H
e e ef f q
e
γ αλ α γ λ λ α γ λ
λ
− + + + − + + −− = + >0. 
So the necessary conditions cannot be satisfied. Similar proof could apply to the case that 
both producers make no signal but make an effort. 
Proof of Point (viii) 
The necessary condition for producer 1 to choose the combination of GI and BA as 
the marketing strategy if it has no incentive to deviate to do BA alone, which means: 
(B6.1) 
1
)0()0(
1
)0()0( nBAGIGIBA ++ > ππ .  
The condition above leads to the frontier below whereby the strategies in which one 
producer chooses the combination of GI and BA and another producer chooses GI alone 
will emerge in equilibrium. 
2 2
11 2 2
2 ( )((2 1) ) ( )(2 )
((4 1) 3 ) (4 3 ) H
c cf q
c
λ α α λ λ α α λ
γ α λ α λ
⎛ ⎞+ − + + += −⎜ ⎟− + +⎝ ⎠ . 
When this frontier is below the horizontal axis in figure 3 of the main text, the strategy 
that one producer chooses the combination of GI and BA, the other producer chooses GI 
alone, and none of them makes an effort is dominated by the strategy that one producer 
chooses BA, the other producer makes no signal, and none of them makes an effort. That 
is, 11f <0, which generates c< )92416(3
1414192432
2234
332234
11 λαλαα
λαλαλαλαα
++
−−−+≈c . The 
exact value of 11c is rather complex. The expression above gives the approximate value 
by ignoring the smaller order of this value. Similarly, the strategy in which both 
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producers choose the combination of GI and BA is dominated by the one in which both 
of the producers choose GI in equilibrium when c<1. Then,  
}
)92416(3
1414192432,1min{ 2234
332234
1 λαλαα
λαλαλαλαα
++
−−−+=c  
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CHAPTER 4.   DISCOUNTING SPOTTED APPLES: INVESTIGATING 
CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT COSMETIC DAMAGE IN AN 
ORGANIC PRODUCT 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The appearance of organic produce is often less than perfect because of limited methods 
of avoiding plant diseases. We use an experimental auction to investigate how cosmetic 
damage affects consumers’ willingness to pay for organic apples. We find that 75% of 
the participants are willing to pay more for organic than for conventional apples given 
identical appearance. However, at the first sight of any imperfection in the appearance of 
the organic apples, this segment is significantly reduced. Furthermore, we find that 
cosmetic damage has a larger impact on the willingness to pay for organic apples than for 
conventional apples. 
 
 
 
 
Key words: appearance, apples, experimental auctions, organic, willingness to pay 
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Introduction 
Until recently, fresh food products such as apples were provided to markets as generic 
products. Today, such products are differentiated by brand, variety, origin, and 
appearance, as well as by the companies’ production and processing methods. Consumers 
are often willing to pay large price premiums for products with the right attributes. As a 
result, product quality and differentiation have become increasingly important to the 
producer.  
Empirical estimates of price variation due to quality factors date back at least to 
Waugh’s seminal study of quality factors affecting vegetable prices (Waugh, 1928). One 
of the most important quality factors is appearance. Appearance includes the intrinsic 
attributes of color, texture, size, uniformity and other visible differences. Several recent 
studies consider how appearance affects consumers’ preference for food products; see 
Acebron and Dopico (2000) for beef; Alfnes et al. (2006) for salmon; and Wei et al. 
(2003) for mandarin oranges. Credence attributes (Darby and Karni, 1973) are other 
quality factors valued by consumers. For fruits, organic production method is a credence 
attribute since consumers cannot identify a product’s method of production through their 
normal use of the product but have to trust the labeling.  
Most previous studies investigating consumer preference for organic foods 
assume that the organic products are similar in appearance to their conventionally 
produced counterparts (Blend and van Ravenswaay, 1999; Loureiro, McCluskey, and 
Mittlehammer, 2001; and Larue et al., 2004). Studies that focus on the effect of cosmetic 
problems find that consumers discount products with cosmetic damage. In a retail setting, 
Thompson and Kidwell (1998) found that the more cosmetic defects there were in 
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organic produce, the less likely were shoppers to buy the organic produce. Experimental-
based results from Roosen et al. (1998) show that if cosmetic attributes are the same, 
consumers tend to pay a positive premium for nonuse of pesticides. However, if the 
nonuse of pesticides results in products with reduced cosmetic quality, fewer consumers 
prefer nonuse of pesticides. Baker (1999) conducted a survey involving consumer 
preferences for food safety attributes in fresh apples (specifically, reduced or no pesticide 
use) and took account of the damage level on red delicious apples using pictures. Using 
clustering techniques, he found that cosmetic damage was most important to consumers 
with higher income. The three studies all find a positive effect from organic production 
(or nonuse of pesticides) and a negative effect of cosmetic damage. However, less well 
understood is the nature of the trade-off—whether the measured response to damage is 
sensitive to the production method, and what the effect is of underlying consumer 
attitudes about production method, environmental issues, and other quality attributes. 
In this paper, we use a fourth-price sealed-bid auction to elicit consumer 
willingness to pay (WTP) for organic and conventional apples with different levels of 
blemish. In contrast to the consumer studies discussed earlier, we use an experimental 
design that allows not only the estimation of the main effects of production method and 
cosmetic damage but also the interaction effects between the two. What is new to the 
experimental auction mechanism used here is the individual drawing of a binding 
alternative. This allows us to combine the positive features of the incentive-compatible 
fourth-price auction with another feature imperative in a WTP study of products that are 
heterogeneous in so many ways, such as apples: the products the participants evaluated 
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were the exact same products they would buy. The individual drawing of a binding 
alternative ensured that there was never more than one buyer of each alternative.  
A principal component factor analysis and random effect models are used in the 
analysis of how the WTP for apples is affected by quality attributes (conventional versus 
organic production methods, degree of blemish, and their interaction), as well as 
interactions among consumers’ stated attitudes toward specific quality attributes (food 
safety concern, environmental concern, tolerance of pesticides, etc.), production method, 
degree of blemish, and consumers’ socio-demographic characteristics. Specifically, we 
investigate the premium for organic apples, the discount for various levels of cosmetic 
damage, how cosmetic damage affects consumers’ WTP for both organic and 
conventional apples, and how attitude and socio-demographic variables affect these 
premiums.  
 
Market Experiment 
The experiment had a within-subject design with two production methods (organic and 
conventional), four appearance levels (degrees of blemish), and two elicitation methods 
(hypothetical and real auctions). In addition, we collected numerous socio-demographic 
and attitude measures. 
 
Products 
The products used for this experiment were 3-pound bags of golden delicious apples. 
Apples were obtained from commercial sources and from university farm orchards. Prior 
to the experiment, the apples were sorted according to their production method and 
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appearance. The production methods included both conventional and organic methods. 
For the appearance, the apples were then sorted by the level of surface blotches (cosmetic 
damage). The blotches were caused by plant diseases and syndromes, namely, sooty 
blotch fungi and russeting, that led to changes that were strictly cosmetic and presented 
no harm to humans or to the taste of apples.  
 The conventional apples were sorted into four grades: SpotA apples were those 
without blotches; SpotB apples were those with about 3% blotch coverage; SpotC apples 
were those with about 5% blotch coverage; and SpotD were those with about 9% blotch 
coverage. The classification of apples was done with assistance from staff with training in 
plant pathology. Because of the lack of variation in their appearance, the organic apples 
were only sorted into two grades: SpotA, apples without blotches; and SpotB, apples with 
3% blotch coverage. All of the sorted apples were packed into clear bags. We will, 
hereafter, refer to organic SpotA apples as Organic A, and conventional SpotA as 
Conventional A, and so on. 
 In the experiment, 12 bags of apples were placed on a large table for visual 
inspection. The apples were labeled as organic or conventional but were not labeled with 
the appearance grade. Instead, participants examined the appearance of the apples and 
made bids based on their own observations. Each alternative in the experiment had one 
specific bag of apples, and several of the alternatives had the same characteristics with 
respect to production method and cosmetic damage. Except for the aforementioned 
heterogeneous appearance, each bag contained apples that were as homogeneous as 
possible in other characteristics, such as number, size, and weight. 
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 We also ran treatments in which we used pictures of apples. The apples in the 
pictures were 3-pound piles, sorted by appearance. In the picture treatments, we had four 
levels of cosmetic damage for both the organic and the conventional apples. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
We conducted fourth-price sealed-bid auctions with simultaneous bidding on 12 
alternatives. A fourth-price sealed-bid auction is an auction in which the bidders submit 
sealed bids and the price is set equal to the fourth-highest bid; the winners are those who 
have bid more than the price. Vickrey (1961) showed that, in such an auction in which 
the price equals the first-rejected bid, it is a weakly dominant strategy for people to bid 
their true WTP for the offered goods. People have an incentive to truthfully reveal their 
private preferences because the auction separates what they say from what they pay. 
Consumers who underbid risk foregoing a profitable purchase, whereas consumers who 
overbid risk making an unprofitable purchase. In the last 15 years, experimental auctions 
have been used to elicit WTP for a wide variety of food quality attributes (see, e.g., 
Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003; Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder, 2004; Lusk et al., 2004; 
Melton et al., 1996; Roosen et al., 1998; Rozan, Stenger, and Willinger, 2004; Umberger 
and Feuz, 2004).  
Recently, several studies have used a uniform nth price auction such as ours to 
elicit WTP for food quality characteristics. See, for example, Umberger and Feuz (2004) 
for an application of a fourth-price sealed-bid auction, and Lusk et al. (2004) for an 
application of a fifth-price sealed-bid auction. Compared with the frequently used 
second-price auction, the fourth-price and other uniform nth price auctions have several 
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benefits. First, if there are multiple winners, a winning position does not lead to an 
exclusive winner and any auction-winning utilities not associated with the product are 
reduced. Second, in a fourth-price auction with seven or more participants there is a 
smaller difference between the median participant’s valuation of the product and the 
price. Therefore, a bid that differs from a participant’s WTP is more likely to have real 
economic consequences. Third, with repeated trials, extreme outliers are less likely to 
affect the price information that the participants receive during the multi-trial 
experiments.  
After the auction, each participant randomly drew his or her exclusive binding 
alternative. The drawing was done without replacement; only one participant could draw 
each of the alternatives as his or her binding alternative. For this to be possible, the 
number of alternatives had to be higher than or equal to the number of participants in 
each session. The price of an alternative was equal to the fourth-highest bid for that 
alternative. If the participants had bid more than the price for their binding alternative 
they had to buy the alternative. This winning restriction allowed us to combine the 
attractive features of the uniform-price auction (discussed earlier) with another feature 
that we felt was imperative in a WTP study of appearance of a heterogeneous product 
such as apples: the products they evaluated were the exact same products they would buy. 
At the beginning of each session, the participants were given a folder containing 
US$20, a consent document, and a questionnaire. There were a total of eight sessions. 
In six of the eight sessions, we first conducted a hypothetical auction in which the 
apples were represented by pictures. We asked participants to examine carefully the 
apples in the pictures before they made their hypothetical bids. After the hypothetical 
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auctions, we replaced the pictures with actual apples and ran one trial with a non-
hypothetical auction. In the last two sessions, we did not run a hypothetical auction. 
Instead, we ran two trials with real auctions.1 To avoid income and substitution effects, 
we randomly drew which of the two real auction trials was to be binding and then drew 
individual binding products. 2 
The participants walked around the table and placed their bids on their bidding 
forms as they studied each alternative. The participants were not allowed to communicate 
with each other during the bidding process. To reduce any systematic ordering effects, 
the participants could start at any of the 12 alternatives on the table. In the picture 
treatments, we had three pictures from each of the four categories of cosmetic 
appearance. Half of the pictures were labeled as organic. In the second half of the 
sessions, the other half of the pictures were labeled as organic. Thus, all the pictures were 
labeled as organic in half of the sessions and as conventional in the other half. This was 
done to reduce any unforeseen effects from small differences in the pictures. When using 
real products (actual apples) we had only SpotA and SpotB organic apples but we had all 
four categories of conventional apples.  
 
Experimental Subjects 
The experiment was conducted at a large midwestern university in 2005. The participants 
were recruited by e-mail notice and advertisement in newsletters on campus. The e-mail 
recruitment of participants went to faculty and staff through solicitations to college-level 
and university units (e.g., departments, physical plant) in order to make the recruitment 
pool as broadly representative of the local area and state population as possible. We 
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restricted the pool to limit participation of graduate students and did not solicit 
undergraduate students. The recruitment letter indicated that participants would be asked 
about their market decisions on apple purchases, but nothing was said about appearance 
or organic production. 
Seventy-four people participated in the experiment, 33% male and 67% female. 
The ages ranged from 20 to 70 years old, with 27% in the age 20-29 category, 30% age 
30-39, 14% age 40-49, 20% age 50-59, and 9% age 60 and older. The age distribution 
was similar to the state average (in 2000, of the share of the state’s population age 20 to 
65, there were 47% in the 20-39 age range compared to the sample of 57% in this range; 
the state had a relatively larger share of the population in their forties). The subjects’ 
average household income was $49,220 with a standard deviation of $30,520.3 The 
median income was $42,500. This compared to the state’s median household income in 
1999 of $40,442. Among the participants, 17% did not have a college diploma, 11% had 
a college diploma, 22% had some graduate school education, and 50% had a graduate 
degree. The recruited sample had higher average education levels than the state average. 
 
Random Effect Model 
We use three sets of variables to explain the variation in WTP. First is the variation in the 
product quality attributes. Second is the variation in socio-demographics and consumers’ 
attitudes. Third is the variation in the experiment. Based on this, we specify the following 
econometric model to explain the consumers’ WTP for the apples:  
 ij j ij j i ijWTP x y zα β γ η ε= + + + +  (1) 
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where ijWTP is individual i’s bid for product j; jx is a vector of product quality attributes 
for product j, including Organic, Spot, and OrgSpot; Organic is a dummy that is one if 
the product is organic, and zero otherwise; Spot is defined as a continuous variable 
measuring the percentage of spot coverage;4 OrgSpot measures the interaction effect 
between the two previous product attributes; ijy  is a vector of interaction effects between 
the socio-demographics and consumers’ attitudes for individual i and the product quality 
attributes Organic and Spot for product j; jz is a vector of design variables including 
Picture, OrgPicture, and SpotPicture where Picture is a dummy that is one for the 
pictures and zero for the real apples, OrgPicture is the interaction between Organic and 
Picture, and SpotPicture is the interaction between Spot and Picture ; and iη  is the 
random individual effect for the ith participants that captures the correlation between the 
bids made by the same participant. The measure iη  is assumed to follow a normal 
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation ησ .  
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the bids divided into two production methods 
(organic and conventional), four appearance levels (SpotA, SpotB, SpotC, and Spot D), 
and two elicitation methods (hypothetical and real auctions). There are several things that 
we can see directly from Table 1. First, on average, consumers are willing to pay more 
for organic apples than for conventional apples with the same appearance. Second, 
consumers on average are willing to pay more for apples with no or little cosmetic 
damage than for apples with more cosmetic damage. Third, consumers state higher WTP 
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on average for all alternatives in the hypothetical auctions than in the real auction. Fourth, 
there are almost no zero bids for the perfect apples; in fact, none of the participants bid 
zero for all the apples. This indicates that the participants were willing to buy apples in 
the auction and that the zero bids for the spotted apples can be interpreted as zero WTP 
for these apples.5 Fifth, the mean bids are below standard market prices. USDA data 
show the average price of fresh apples is $0.83 per pound in 1999 (Reed, Frazão, and 
Itskowitz, 2004), or $0.96 per pound when adjusted to 2004 apple price levels. The $0.96 
price per pound would be $2.89 for three pounds. Our results are therefore likely to give 
conservative estimates of the WTP differences.  
One of the initial tasks was to identify and develop measures of consumer 
attitudes and preferences based on the survey questions. In addition to direct responses to 
questions, several consumer attitudes toward quality attributes were measured as 
composite constructs based on the participants’ degree of agreement with selected 
statements. The selection and ranking of the questions included in the composites were 
done by principal component factor analysis. To measure consumers’ sensitivity to price 
(Price) we asked the participants if they agreed or did not agree with four statements 
about the trade-off between quality and price using a five-point Likert scale. For instance, 
one statement read, “I usually buy the lowest priced products.” Consumers with a larger 
value of the index Price tend to be more sensitive to price of products. Other composites 
included consumers’ concern with the environment (Envir), consumers’ tolerance of 
pesticides (Pest), and consumers’ attitude toward appearance of apples (Appear). 
Consumers with a larger value of the index Envir were more concerned about the 
environment and held stronger beliefs about the idea that organic production can improve 
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the environment. The measure of consumers’ tolerance of pesticides (Pest) was based on 
two statements concerning the safety of and restriction on pesticides. Consumers with a 
larger Pest index value were less tolerant of pesticides. The index on appearance of 
apples (Appear) is a construct based on consumers’ concern about the importance of 
apple color, shape, texture, and size. Consumers with a larger value of Appear expressed 
more concerned about the appearance of apples. Principal component factor analysis 
indicated these composite constructs were uni-dimensional (all had alpha reliability of 0.6 
or higher) (Cronbach, 1951).  
Other measures of consumer attitudes are based on single statements. They include 
attitudes toward food safety (Safe), taste (Taste), and nutrition (Nutrition) of apples. 
Consumers with a larger value of each of these indexes were more concerned about the 
respective attributes. It is important to note that all of these measures of consumer attitudes 
are based on stated preferences, whereas the auctions elicit revealed preferences. The 
definitions of all the variables used in the segmentation are shown in Table 2.  
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the difference in WTP between 
Organic A and Conventional A (OA-CA), and Organic B and Conventional A (OB-CA). 
OA-CA is calculated by subtracting the individual participant’s mean bid for 
Conventional A from the same participant’s mean bid on Organic A. Similarly, OB-CA is 
calculated by subtracting the individual participant’s mean bid for Conventional A from 
the same participant’s mean bid on Organic B.  
From Figure 1, we can see that 19 (25%) of the participants bid higher for the 
Conventional A apples than the organic apples with the same appearance. This indicates 
that these consumers think that there is a negative value associated with organic 
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production. Of the 55 (75%) participants bidding more for the Organic A than the 
Conventional A, 18 (24%) bid more than 50¢ more, eight (11%) bid more than $1 more, 
and two (3%) bid more than $2 more for the organic apples. 
Comparing Organic B with Conventional A, we can see that of the 55 participants 
preferring the organic apples when they had the same appearance, now only 21 (28% of 
the total sample) still prefer the organic apples. This drastic decline in the group 
preferring the organic apples indicates that the appearance is very important for many 
consumers.  
Table 3 includes information about the socio-demographic and attitude variables 
across the three consumer groups indicated by Figure 1. Group 1 prefers conventional to 
organic (Bid Conventional A > Bid Organic A), group 2 prefers organic but only if the 
appearance is as good as for the conventional (Bid Organic A > Bid Conventional A > 
Bid Organic B), and group 3 prefers the organic even when the appearance is lower than 
that of the conventional (Bid Organic B> Bid Conventional A). We can see that the 
participants in group 1 tend to be younger than those in other groups and they are less 
concerned about the food safety–related attributes such as environment, pesticides, food 
safety and so on. And they are the group that has the lowest income level and is most 
concerned about price; that is, they are the group with the highest sensitivity to price. The 
consumers in group 2 care more about appearance than do the other groups. They are 
almost neutral to environment and pesticides. In contrast, those in group 3 value the food 
safety–related attributes and taste the most, and they value appearance and price the least. 
Those in group 3 have the highest income and education levels, and they are the oldest 
compared with the other two groups. 
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To see if these groups differ significantly in the socio-demographics and attitudes, 
MANOVA and the Wilk’s ∗Λ  test are used (Johnson and Wichern, 2002). ANOVA is 
employed to test if the groups differ in each of the variables. The P-values of the tests are  
listed in Table 3. The Wilk’s ∗Λ  test statistic when including all the variables is 0.66, and 
the corresponding P-value is 0.20. So the null hypothesis that the mean vectors are the 
same across the groups cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. The P-value of the 
Wilk’s ∗Λ  test statistic obtained by including only the socio-demographic variables is 
0.51, so the null hypothesis that the groups are the same in socio-demographic variables 
cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. However, the ANOVA results show that 
the three groups differ in income at the 5% significance level. The P-value of the Wilk’s 
∗Λ  test statistic when including only the attitude variables is 0.04, so the null hypothesis 
that the groups are the same in their attitudes toward food safety–related quality 
attributes, price, appearance, taste, and nutrition is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
We find that the three groups differ in attitudes at the 5% level of significance. Thus, 
from the ANOVA results we conclude that the three groups differ mainly in their 
attitudes toward price, environment, appearance, and taste, and by their income levels. 
It is useful to compare our results with those of Roosen et al. (1998); the two 
studies were done 10 years apart and both were conducted in the state of Iowa. Although 
the two studies differ in many aspects, they address a similar valuation problem. In the 
Roosen et al. study, 38% of the participants had a high degree of concern about pesticide 
use, and of these, 76% preferred stricter pesticides regulations. In our study, 42% of the 
participants were (very) concerned about pesticide use; of these, 88% think stricter 
pesticide regulations should be set. Furthermore, Roosen et al. find that 35% of 
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participants consistently bid zero for all potential upgrades from conventional apples to 
apples produced with no pesticides. In contrast, in our study, 25% of the participants bid 
less for the Organic A than for the Conventional A.  
 
The Random Effect Models 
We estimated three random effects models. All three models include the product attribute 
and experimental design variables. In addition, Model 1 includes socio-demographic 
interaction effects, Model 2 includes attitude interaction effects, and Model 3 includes 
both socio-demographic and attitude interaction effects. We estimated the three models to 
check the robustness of the estimation and to avoid any identification problems.6 The 
models include only the interaction effects of the socio-demographic and/or attitude 
variables with Organic and Spot; the effects of the socio-demographic and/or attitude 
variables alone have been largely captured by the individual random effect.7 The results 
from the three models are quite similar, which indicates that the estimates are robust 
toward small changes in the model specification.  
Maximum likelihood was used to estimate the parameters in equation (1). To 
simplify the interpretation of the parameters associated with the quality attributes, the 
variables that interact with them are standardized with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. The standardization is done by subtracting the respective variable’s 
mean and dividing by its standard deviation. The estimated parameters from the random 
effects models are shown in Table 4.  
From Table 4 we can see that the apple quality attributes (organic and spot) affect 
the consumers’ WTP for apples and the results are statistically significant. The three 
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models get almost identical results for the main effects. Also, the constant, which can be 
interpreted as the average bid for 3 pounds of conventional apples without any spots, is 
very similar among the three models: about $1.74. The production method affects 
consumer WTP significantly. Consumers are willing to pay more for organic apples than 
for conventional apples: the premium for organic apples without any spots is about $0.35 
per 3 pounds ($0.12/pound). However, the interaction between organic production and 
cosmetic damage (level of spots) is statistically significant: the premium for organic 
production decreases $0.04 per 3-pound bag when the level of spot damage increases by 
1%. Taking account of the combined direct and indirect effects, the consumer WTP 
decreases by $0.14 per 3-pound bag when the level of spot damage for conventional 
apples increases by 1%. For organic apples, when the level of spot damage increases by 
1%, the consumer WTP decreases by $0.18. The difference in the discount between the 
two production methods is statistically significant.  
Figure 2 summarizes the consumer WTP for 3 pounds of organic apples and 
conventional apples with different levels of spots used in our experiment. Note that 
consumers’ WTP for Organic B apples is less than that for Conventional A apples; 
consumers’ WTP for Organic D apples is less than that for Conventional C apples. We can 
conclude that consumers make a trade-off between production method and the blemish 
level of the apples. Even though, in general, consumers are willing to pay more for organic 
apples, when there are “too many” blemishes on the organic apples, consumers prefer to 
buy conventional apples. An extrapolation of the numbers shown in Figure 2 to apples with 
even more spots than the amounts on Spot D apples (9%) shows that consumers would not 
be willing to pay for such apples regardless of the production method. 
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As shown in Table 4, the interactions between the socio-demographic variables or 
attitude variables and the production methods or damage levels show some statistically 
significant interaction effects. Model 1 and Model 3 indicate that the interaction effect 
between income and organic production methods is positive and significant. Those who 
have higher income are willing to pay a higher price premium than those who have a 
lower income level. Other interactions with the production method are not statistically 
significant. 
Model 1 and Model 3 show that two of the socio-demographic interactions with 
the spot damage are statistically significant. The interaction effect between gender and 
spot damage is negative and significant at the 5% significance level; females are more 
reluctant to buy apples with spots. One possible explanation for this might be that 
females show more concern about the aesthetics of food than do men. Or, perhaps more 
time and experience in grocery shopping on average (Hamrick and Shelley, 2005) 
contribute to females’ lower bids for apples with more spots. The significant interaction 
effect between education level and spot level in Model 1 indicates that those with higher 
education levels are more willing to buy apples with spots.  
Model 2 and Model 3 show that several of the interaction effects between organic 
production methods and attitude variables are significant. Those who are less sensitive to 
price (PriceOrg) and consumers with greater concerns about the environment (EnvirOrg) 
are willing to pay a higher price premium for organic products compared to others. 
Positive interaction with environmental concerns suggests positive association between 
organic production methods and environmental interests in the minds of consumers. In 
addition, consumers’ concern about food safety is also positively associated with organic 
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production (SafeOrg). Those who are more concerned about food safety are willing to 
pay a higher premium for organic apples than those who are less concerned with food 
safety, a result that suggests that consumers think organic products are safer than 
conventional products. Finally, those who are more concerned with taste (TasteOrg) are 
willing to pay a higher premium for organic product. In summary, willingness to pay 
more for organic products is enhanced by consumers’ being less sensitive to price, more 
concerned with the environment, more concerned with the safety of food products, and 
their having high levels of interest in the “tastiness” of food products.  
These results are consistent with previous studies showing that consumers 
associate organic production methods with a reduced health risk and may chose to reduce 
the risk from pesticide residues by switching to organically grown products (Williams 
and Hammitt, 2001; Magnusson  and Cranfield, 2005). Recent survey evidence shows 
that consumers purchase organic foods because they perceive the foods to be fresh 
(68.3%), better for health, and a better source of nutrition (67.1%) (Whole Foods Market, 
2005). Over 70% (70.3%) of those surveyed said they bought organic food or beverages 
in order to avoid pesticides.  
The interaction effects between spot level and attitude constructs are less strong, 
though similar between Models 2 and 3. The interaction effect between concerns about 
appearance and spot damage (AppearSpot) is negative and statistically significant for 
Model 2 and Model 3. Those who are more concerned with appearance place a higher 
discount for apples with increased levels of spot damage.  
Controlling for the experimental design was important. The variable Picture is 
highly significant in all three models. Relative to the average bid of $1.74 for a 3-pound 
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bag of conventional apples without spots, participants bid about one dollar more for 
apples presented in pictures than for real apples. In this respect, our results are in line 
with the large literature on hypothetical bias in valuation studies. Because the participants 
did not need to pay the price they bid to buy the product when presented with pictures, 
they tended to overbid for pictures compared to the cases where they were presented with 
real products and faced the chance they would need to pay out of pocket for the real 
product.8 The interaction effect between Organic and Picture (PictureOrg) is positive 
and significant in Model 2 and the interaction effect between Spot and Picture 
(PictureSpot) is negative and significant in all three models, which indicates that the 
hypothetical bias is not fixed with the changes in WTP. Actually, from Table 1 we get 
similar results. Hypothetical bias seems to be proportional to WTP. If we divide the sum 
of the mean WTP for apples shown in a picture by the sum of the mean WTP for real 
apples, we find that the WTP in the hypothetical auction is 1.6 times that of the real 
auction.  
Both ησˆ  and ˆεσ  are significant. A likelihood ratio test was conducted concerning 
the individual random effect (null hypothesis: ησ =0). The test statistic had values of 290 
for Model 1, 295 for Model 2, and 299 for Model 3. All of the corresponding P-values 
were < 0.001 and the null hypothesis was rejected for each model. That is, the individual 
random effects cannot be ignored and need to be included in order to estimate the results 
accurately. The ρˆ  value for the models was 0.37. This parameter measures the 
correlation between the bids on different apples by the same participants. 
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Conclusions 
Consumers want environmental friendly production methods, but they do not want the 
natural consequences of the environmental friendly production: the blemished appearance 
of products. This result is of course very troublesome for organic producers. Organic 
producers are less able to avoid problems with cosmetic appearance and they are hit 
harder in the retail market if they produce less-than-perfect apples. At first this result is 
somewhat surprising, given that previous studies have shown that the majority of 
consumers say they buy organic products to avoid pesticides. However, since the 
consumers are willing to pay more for perfect organic apples than for perfect 
conventional apples, a percentage discount from cosmetic damage yields a higher dollar 
value in the discount of organic apples than for the conventional apples. 
Of specific interest in this study is the premium that consumers are willing to pay 
for organic apples and the effect of different levels of cosmetic damage on the premium. 
We find that the premium for organic apples decreases as the level of spots increases, a 
result that supports earlier findings of Thompson and Kidwell (1998) and Roosen et al. 
(1998). Furthermore, our experimental design allows us to estimate interaction effects 
between production method and cosmetic damage. We find not only that the negative 
effect from cosmetic damage offsets the positive effect from organic production but also 
that cosmetic damage leads to discounting the premium for organic production. 
Consumers’ tolerance of cosmetic damage on apples is limited. Even at relatively low 
levels of blemishes on the surface of organic apples, consumers preferred perfect-looking 
conventional apples. The consumers differ with respect to how they rank the importance 
of appearance. There is a relatively large segment of consumers in the organic market 
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who are willing to accept a small level of cosmetic damage. However, if apple growers 
try to sell less-than-perfect organic apples at a price that is significantly above the going 
price of conventional apples, very few consumers will be willing to buy the organic 
apples.  
This finding suggests the importance of quality attributes connected to cosmetic 
appearance, as is the case today with the fruit grading system of U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, and that exists in many private contracts for 
produce. To a large extent, fresh fruits in U.S. grocery stores have uniform appearance, 
while the fruits with imperfect appearance often are diverted as processed product such as 
fruit juice and sauce. Our findings show that even when there is no strict federal grading 
system, fresh fruits with cosmetic damage have little potential in today’s retail market 
because of consumers’ limited tolerance for imperfect cosmetic attributes. When faced 
with limited consumer tolerance for cosmetic damage, apple producers must account for 
the trade-off between production technology and cosmetic damage in their production 
decisions in order to ensure their profits.  
 
Footnotes 
1 The motivation of this design is to control for any possible effects the hypothetical 
auction in the first round might have on the real auction in the second round. The 
estimation results show that the effect is negligible.  
2 The instructions are available from the authors upon request.  
3 Three of the observations had missing values on income, and these values were imputed 
using best-subset regression. The independent variables for the regression were 
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Education, Age, Gender, and Association with the university (such as faculty, staff, 
student, etc.). The imputation was completed using STATA7.0.  
4 The variable Spot is created as a continuous variable from the four graded levels and 
equals the average spot level in the spot categories, i.e., Spot equals 0 for SpotA, 3 for 
SpotB, 5 for SpotC, and 9 for SpotD.  
5 Roosen et al. (1998) asked the participants to bid for an upgrade from one endowed bag 
of apples to other bags of apples. Thirty-five percent of the participants bid zero for all 
the alternatives. Their upgrade design did not allow them to distinguish between those 
participants who preferred the endowed bag and those who were indifferent between the 
bags. Bidding on all products allows us to measure both positive and negative price 
premiums. 
6 We estimated the correlation between the socio-demographic variables and preference 
attitude variables and found that the largest correlation was 0.17. We conclude that there 
is no multicollinearity problem in Model 3. However, since we have only 74 participants 
and Model 3 includes 28 independent variables, there may be identification problems. For 
this reason we include both Model 1 and Model 2 in the analysis. 
7 We tried another model that included both the individual socio-demographic variables 
and attitude preference variables and the interaction effects. To test the model 
specification, a likelihood ratio test was conducted. The test statistic was 6, which is less 
than the critical value 19.68, so the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the individual 
socio-demographic variables and attitudes preference variables are zero cannot be 
rejected at the 0.05 significance level. 
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8 We ran another model using the bids on pictures of apples only and found the constant 
(the average bid for 3-pound conventional perfect apples) was $2.78 instead of $1.74, and 
the premium for organic was $0.46 instead of $0.35 for 3 pounds of apples.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Bids 
       
Production method Auction Statistics SpotA SpotB SpotC SpotD 
       
Conventional Hypothetical Mean 2.73 2.21 1.60 0.73 
  S.D. 1.60 1.26 0.98 0.74 
  Median 2.25 1.90 1.38 0.59 
  % zero bids 1.89% 1.89% 5.67% 37.7% 
Conventional Real Mean 1.83 1.15 0.99 0.57 
  S.D. 0.88 0.74 0.77 0.59 
  Median 1.74 1.18 0.87 0.49 
  % zero bids 2.06% 13.4% 18.56% 38.14% 
Organic Hypothetical Mean 3.22 2.60 1.89 0.96 
  S.D. 1.69 1.42 1.18 1.05 
  Median 2.70 2.15 1.75 0.75 
  % zero bids 0 0 3.77% 33.96% 
Organic Real Mean 2.08 1.58   
  S.D. 0.95 0.88   
  Median 1.93 1.45   
  % zero bids 0 1.03%   
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Table 2. Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
Product attributes    
Organic Organically (=1) or conventionally (=0) produced  0.46 0.50 0 1
Spot Continuous measure of percentage coverage of spots 3.64 3.34 0 9
OrgSpot Interaction effect of variable Organic and variable Spot   
 
Socio-demographics 
  
Agea Age of the participants 40.30 13.18 25 65
Gender Male=0, Female=1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Edub Education on a 6-point scale 4.96 1.27 2 6
Income Income in thousands of dollars 49.22 30.52 7.5 120
 
Attitudes    
Pricec  Price sensitivity 0 1 -2.37  1.98
Envirc Concern about environment 0 1 -2.29  1.89
Pestc Pesticides risk tolerance 0 1 -2.41  2.33
Appearc Attitude towards appearance of apples 0 1 -2.64  1.84
Tasted Taste of apples 4.70 0.58 3 5
Safed Food safety 4.05 1.13 1 5
Nutritiond Nutrition of apples 3.48 1.22 1 5
a The age variable has seven categories and we have used the midpoint of the categories to form a continuous variable. 
b 1 = Some high school, 2 = High school diploma, 3 = Some college or less, 4 = College diploma, 5= Some graduate 
school, and 6 = Graduate degree. 
c Factors 
d Based on the answer to the following question: How important are the following attributes of apples when you decide 
which apples to buy? (5-point scale where 1 is not important and 5 is very important) 
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Table 3. Socio-demographics and Attitudes of the Groups 
                         Group 1 Group 2 Group 3      
                             (19 a)                      (34 a)                    (21 a)              ANOVA   MANOVA 
                   Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  P-value     P-value    
 
Socio-demographics 
  Age            36.05 15.23 38.23   12.24      43.10  12.49         0.21 
     Gender        0.63    0.49 0.71   0.46  0.67 0.48         0.84 
     Edu             4.84 1.30 5.00   1.15 5.10 1.44         0.82 
  Income      36.97 22.75 41.14   31.06      58.69  32.85         0.05  0.51c  
 
Attitudes    
 Priceb         0.59     1.19 -0.12   0.70       -0.34 1.08    0.01 
 Envirb         -0.52 1.01 0.02   1.01       0.46 0.79      0.01 
    Pestb           -0.22 1.12 -0.05   0.96        0.28   0.97          0.27    
    Appearb      -0.17 1.10 0.27   1.01       -0.31   -0.84          0.08  
Tasteb         -0.34 0.98 -0.01   0.94        0.37  1.06        0.08 
    Safeb           -0.16 0.98 0.10   1.03        0.32  0.98     0.22 
    Nutritionb    0.12 0.96 -0.18   1.07        0.02   0.94         0.35 0.04d 
                                                                                                                                 0.20e  
a  Number of participants in each group.  
b These attitudes variables are standardized. 
c MANOVA of socio-demographic variables. 
d  MANOVA of attitude variables. 
e  MANOVA of both socio-demographic and attitude variables. 
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Table 4. WTP for (Organic) Apples with Spots, Random Individual Effect Modelsa 
               Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variables              Coef.      S.D.    P-value     Coef.    S.D.   P-value     Coef.    S.D.   P-value 
Product attributes 
 Constant 1.74***b 0.10 0.00 1.75*** 0.09 0.00 1.74*** 0.09 0.00  
 Organic 0.35*** 0.08 0.00 0.34*** 0.08 0.00 0.35*** 0.08 0.00 
  Spot -0.14*** 0.01 0.00 -0.14*** 0.01 0.00 -0.14*** 0.01 0.00  
 OrgSpot -0.04*** 0.01 0.00 -0.04*** 0.01 0.00 -0.04*** 0.01 0.00 
Socio-demographic interaction effects 
 EduOrgc -0.04 0.05 0.48    -0.04 0.05 0.46 
 GenderOrg  0.001 0.05 0.98    -0.05 0.05 0.32 
 AgeOrg -0.07 0.06 0.19    -0.07 0.07 0.28 
 IncomeOrg 0.20*** 0.06 0.00    0.14** 0.07 0.03 
 AgeSpot -0.01 0.01 0.26    -0.01 0.01 0.24 
 GenderSpot -0.02** 0.01 0.02    -0.02* 0.01 0.02 
 EduSpot  0.01** 0.01 0.08    0.01 0.01 0.19 
 IncomeSpot 0.003 0.01 0.73     0.001 0.01 0.87 
Attitude interaction effects 
 PriceOrg    -0.11** 0.05 0.05 -0.09* 0.06 0.10 
 EnvirOrg         0.20*** 0.07 0.01 0.21*** 0.07 0.01 
 SafeOrg    0.25*** 0.07 0.00 0.22*** 0.07 0.00 
 PestOrg    -0.009 0.07 0.89 -0.02 0.07 0.78 
 AppearOrg    0.01 0.05 0.82 0.02 0.05 0.68 
 TasteOrg    0.26*** 0.07 0.00 0.24*** 0.07 0.00 
 NutritionOrg    0.009 0.05 0.86 -0.005 0.05 0.92 
 PriceSpot    -0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.37 
 EnvirSpot    -0.006 0.01 0.59 -0.002 0.01 0.89
 SafeSpot    0.001 0.01 0.91 0.005 0.01 0.63 
 PestSpot     0.008 0.01 0.43 -0.001 0.01 0.88  
 AppearSpot    -0.03*** 0.01 0.00 -0.02*** 0.01 0.00 
 TasteSpot    -0.001 0.01 0.92 0.005 0.01 0.64 
 NutritionSpot    -0.001 0.01 0.89 0.002 0.01 0.82 
Experimental design effects 
 Picture 1.04*** 0.10 0.00 1.01*** 0.10 0.00 1.04*** 0.09 0.00 
     PictureOrg 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.18* 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.18 
    PictureSpot -0.08*** 0.02 0.00 -0.08*** 0.02 0.00 -0.08*** 0.02 0.00 
Model parameters 
 ησ  0.61*** 0.06 0.00 0.59*** 0.05  0.00 0.60*** 0.06 0.00 
 εσ  0.80*** 0.02 0.00 0.78*** 0.02  0.00 0.77*** 0.02 0.00    
  ρ  0.37 0.04  0.37 0.04  0.37 0.05   
Note: The models are random individual effect models estimated with STATA 7.0.  
a Likelihood ratio test statistics for the goodness of fit of the models are 619 for Model 1, 662 for Model 2, 
and 679 for Model 3, and the p-values are less than 0.0001.  
b Single, double, and triple asterisks (*) denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,  respectively. 
c EduOrg means the interaction effect between variable Edu and Organic and EduSpot means the 
interaction effect between variable Edu and Spot. Similar definitions hold for the attitude interaction effect 
variables and experiment design variables as well. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Distribution of the Difference in Willingness to Pay between 
Organic A and B and Conventional A  
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Figure 2. Consumer WTP for Apples with Different Levels of Spots 
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